New Zealand's Involvement in Maritime Security in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, from 1982 Onwards by Green, Jordan Darcy
 
 
 
http://waikato.researchgateway.ac.nz/ 
 
 
Research Commons at the University of Waikato 
 
Copyright Statement: 
The digital copy of this thesis is protected by the Copyright Act 1994 (New Zealand). 
The thesis may be consulted by you, provided you comply with the provisions of the Act 
and the following conditions of use:  
 Any use you make of these documents or images must be for research or private 
study purposes only, and you may not make them available to any other person.  
 Authors control the copyright of their thesis. You will recognise the author’s right to 
be identified as the author of the thesis, and due acknowledgement will be made to 
the author where appropriate.  
 You will obtain the author’s permission before publishing any material from the 
thesis.  
 
New Zealand’s Involvement in Maritime 
Security in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, 
from 1982 Onwards 
 
 
 
A thesis 
submitted in fulfilment 
of the requirements for the degree 
of 
 
 
Master of Arts in International Relations and 
Security Studies 
 
 
 
At 
 
 
The University of Waikato 
 
 
 
By 
 
 
 
JORDAN D. GREEN 
 
 
__________ 
 
 
 
The University of Waikato 
2010 
  
ii 
 
Abstract 
Surrounded by water, hundreds of miles from its nearest neighbour, New 
Zealand is uniquely placed as a maritime nation. Therefore, maritime 
security is a highly important consideration for New Zealand. Despite this 
fact, New Zealand‟s focus on maritime security has not always been 
strong. This thesis examines New Zealand‟s involvement in maritime 
security in the three areas which its security policy focuses on: New 
Zealand territory, the Pacific, and Southeast Asia. 
After negotiations for the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS) were successfully completed in 1982, the global maritime 
situation changed dramatically. Vast areas of oceans which had once 
been outside any nations‟ jurisdiction were now the source of territorial 
disputes. UNCLOS left New Zealand responsible for the fifth largest 
exclusive economic zone in the world. During the years following World 
War Two, New Zealand‟s contribution to Pacific regional maritime security 
had focused on combating the possible threat from the Soviet Navy. 
However, following UNCLOS, that focus changed. With its newly acquired 
fisheries resources, New Zealand began to focus on resource protection 
through developments such as the establishment of the quota 
management system and regional cooperation. A shift away from focusing 
on traditional western alliance obligations was compounded by a falling 
out with the United States over nuclear ship visits, the signing of the South 
Pacific Nuclear Free Zone treaty and the bombing of the Rainbow Warrior 
by the French Secret Service.  
After the end of the Cold War, New Zealand focused on increasing its 
defence relations with other nations through a range of activities and 
organisations including Closer Defence Relations with Australia, the Five 
Power Defence Arrangements, the Mutual Assistance Programme and the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum. New Zealand 
also carried out a series of defence policy reviews which greatly affected 
defence policy and force structure, resulting in New Zealand disbanding its 
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Air Combat Force and deciding to reduce the Navy‟s Combat Force to only 
two frigates by 2005. During this period, fisheries became a highly 
significant issue and New Zealand was heavily involved in establishing 
Pacific fisheries management regimes. 
Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, New Zealand‟s 
primary focus on security turned to terrorism and other asymmetric threats. 
Existing regional organisations began to adjust to address asymmetric 
threats and, in Southeast Asia in particular, maritime security began to 
feature heavily on the agenda of these organisations. At this time, New 
Zealand‟s focus on maritime security was strengthening; this was seen 
through its purchase of seven new ships for the Navy and its increasing 
involvement in regional bodies dealing with maritime threats.  
The future holds a wide range of maritime security challenges for New 
Zealand. New Zealand must prepare itself for a wide range of unexpected 
challenges as well as being ready to deal with the threats which have 
already been identified. New Zealand‟s current focus on maritime security 
is strong but it cannot afford to let this slip. 
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Chapter One - Introduction 
New Zealand is a maritime nation both in geographic location and from its 
historical experience. New Zealand‟s closest neighbours are hundreds of 
kilometres away, meaning that New Zealand possesses a considerable 
sea moat. Because of this, New Zealand‟s focus on maritime security 
should be strong. A range of definitions of maritime security have been 
suggested by academics and there is no definitive or obvious choice as to 
which is the best or most accurate. Early definitions of maritime security 
tended to have a narrow focus on state based threats. Traditionally, 
maritime security was considered a purely naval matter and involved 
protecting a state from sea-based attacks against its territory and 
interests. However, as the security situation has evolved, new challenges 
have emerged and as such new definitions have been created. Bateman 
and Bergin present a broader definition of maritime security: 
Comprehensive maritime security requires good order at sea; 
reduced illegal activity; maritime border protection; protection and 
preservation of the marine environment; and the conservation of 
marine living resources. As well as encompassing a range of non‑
traditional threats, maritime security is now more closely linked with 
maritime safety than in the past.1  
This thesis will attempt to apply a comprehensive definition of maritime 
security rather than the traditionally narrow view. The contemporary 
definition offered by Bateman and Bergin acknowledges the wide range of 
threats society now faces and shows the many ways in which these can 
affect a country‟s maritime security. 
Any direct military threat to New Zealand would have to come from under 
or over the sea and many of the other threats to New Zealand‟s interests 
will come from the sea as well. With the majority of New Zealand‟s trade 
                                            
1
 Sam Bateman and Anthony Bergin, Sea Change: Advancing Australia’s Ocean Interests 
(Barton, ACT: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2009), pp. 51-52. 
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travelling by sea, New Zealand is also dependent on secure sea lanes 
around the world. New Zealand also has one of the world‟s largest 
Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), covering an area of approximately 1.3 
million square nautical miles or 15 times New Zealand‟s landmass.  
In the early years, New Zealand thrived on maritime trade and industries 
and this created a heavy dependence on the sea and its resources. 
However, with the increase in technology and the growth of agriculture as 
New Zealand‟s primary industry, the nation has turned its attention away 
from the sea somewhat. While individuals and families may have a close 
connection to the sea in recreational activities, many New Zealanders‟ 
concerns with regard to the maritime realm end at the horizon. 
There have been times when maritime threats have been highlighted such 
as the threat of the Japanese Navy during World War II (WWII) and then 
concerns about the Soviet Navy during the Cold War. However, for many 
New Zealanders and consequently many governments, many of the 
threats identified by contemporary definitions of maritime security were not 
even considered. Threats to fisheries resources only became a significant 
concern after New Zealand claimed a 200 nautical mile (nm) EEZ in 1978. 
However, while the New Zealand Government wanted to protect this 
resource, it was not an economic priority, and therefore inadequate ships 
were purchased in the mid-1970s because they were cheaper. This 
demonstrated that economic interests trumped this type of security 
concern.  
The New Zealand Government continued to focus on traditional maritime 
security throughout the Cold War period with concerns about the Soviet 
Union‟s Navy and the need to fulfil New Zealand‟s obligations to its 
western allies leading it to maintain a fleet of anti-submarine warfare 
(ASW) capable frigates. Other threats, however, were given a low priority. 
The signing of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) increased the attention paid to other areas of maritime security, 
such as fisheries, as did the end of the United States–New Zealand leg of 
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the Australia, New Zealand and the United States Security Treaty 
(ANZUS) alliance. A series of decisions were made during the 1980s 
which distanced New Zealand from its traditional western allies. These 
were primarily based around New Zealand‟s anti-nuclear stance and its 
banning of nuclear-powered or armed vessels. 
The end of the Cold War, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, removed 
what was seen as the primary naval threat to New Zealand. Because of 
this, New Zealand‟s focus shifted away from traditional maritime security 
and began to focus on other maritime threats. This led it to become 
involved in a range of multilateral efforts to address maritime security and 
in particular fisheries. New Zealand was also involved in building 
relationships with countries both in Southeast Asia and the Pacific which 
would become important in addressing issues of maritime security at a 
later date. 
After the events of 11 September 2001, terrorism forced its way onto the 
global security agenda. While terrorist attacks had occurred before, the 
scale and sophistication of these attacks shocked the world. These attacks 
also had a significant impact on considerations of maritime security, 
particularly in Southeast Asia. Towards the end of the 1990s and the 
beginning of the 2000s, piracy also emerged as a threat in Southeast 
Asia. 2  The emergence of these two threats, coupled with the ever 
increasing focus on fisheries and other resource protection, led to non-
traditional maritime security issues becoming the primary focus for New 
Zealand. 
                                            
2 While definitions of piracy differ between including attacks in territorial waters, or purely 
on the high seas, in order to get a full understanding of the scope of the problem, it is 
important to examine both attacks on the high seas as well as armed robbery at sea 
within territorial waters. The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) definition of piracy 
includes both attacks on the high seas and within territorial waters, while the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) definition, inline with UNCLOS, includes only those attacks 
on the high seas and thus outside of state territory. When examining figures from either 
organization it is therefore important to be aware of what type of attacks they are 
including and what type they are excluding. This thesis will look at both piracy on the high 
seas and armed robbery at sea under the title piracy in order to present a full picture of 
the threat to maritime security. John F. Bradford, 'Shifting the Tides Against Piracy in 
Southeast Asian Waters', Asian Survey, 48, no. 3 (2008), p. 476. 
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At the beginning of the new millennium, New Zealand‟s military ability to 
deal with maritime security was considerably diminished. This was due to 
the disbandment of the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) Air Combat 
Force as well as the reduction in the Naval Combat Force to only two 
frigates. However, following the purchase of seven new ships under 
Project Protector the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) increased its 
capacity to address issues of maritime security both in home waters and 
abroad, including the Southern Ocean and the Pacific. These purchases 
emphasise New Zealand‟s continuing commitment to maritime security 
and in particular its non-traditional elements. 
Purpose of Thesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine New Zealand‟s involvement in 
maritime security in the regions of Southeast Asia and the Pacific, as well 
as at home. These regions were selected because they are the two 
regions in which New Zealand has been most involved over the last 65 
years, and they appear to be the most important as New Zealand looks to 
the future.  
The thesis takes the view that the completion and signing of UNCLOS was 
a highly significant event in both regional and global maritime security and 
therefore makes a good starting point from which to address New 
Zealand‟s involvement in maritime security. While in some cases, such as 
the declarations of EEZs, the signing of the treaty lagged behind state 
practice, it was the process of negotiations for the Convention which often 
lead to these decisions by individual states. Not only did UNCLOS restate 
and codify principles which could be considered customary international 
law, but it also brought about new state practices which in turn became 
customary law themselves. It was also highly significant in creating new 
international standards and despite the fact that it did not receive the 
requisite number of ratifications until 1993 (only coming into force in 1994) 
many of the principles it contained had already become the accepted 
international norm and thus developed into customary international law. 
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1982 is thus an important date for maritime security and other maritime 
related matters.  
The structure of this thesis then is based around a chronological 
breakdown, starting with the background to New Zealand‟s maritime 
security involvement before UNCLOS and continuing with other important 
dates and events which see the chapters divided into approximately 
decadal divisions. The nature of New Zealand‟s activities at home and its 
involvement in the two regions often differed and thus each chapter is 
broken into three major sections, namely: New Zealand, Southeast Asia, 
and the Pacific. Within each of these sections, many different issues or 
events are examined; where issues cross over between two or more 
regions that overlap is duly acknowledged.  
Chapter Breakdown 
The thesis is divided into seven chapters including this introduction and a 
conclusion. Chapter two gives a brief history of New Zealand‟s 
involvement in maritime security from the end of World War II through to 
the signing of UNCLOS in 1982. This chapter sets the scene for the rest of 
the thesis and provides a solid foundation for the discussion that follows. It 
also adds to the base of knowledge which will be used in the examination 
of future prospects and suggested actions. The period covered by chapter 
two was characterised by New Zealand seeking security through relations 
with important allies. In the early years, Britain was still New Zealand‟s 
primary guarantor of security and of maritime security in particular. 
However, as the consequences of WWII began to sink in, New Zealand 
transferred its dependence from Britain to the United States. This period, 
1945 to 1982, was characterised by a building of new alliances and a 
modification of old agreements. 
Chapter three examines the period between the signing of UNCLOS in 
1982 and the end of the Cold War and breakup of the Soviet Union at the 
end of that decade. The significance of this event, or series of events, for 
international relations cannot be denied, and the area of maritime security 
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is no exception. Throughout the Cold War, and especially in its last ten 
years, one of New Zealand‟s primary naval contributions was that of its 
submarine detection and anti-submarine warfare capability. With the end 
of the Cold War, the threat of the Soviet Navy was no longer present and 
the strategic balance was furthered tipped in favour of the Western 
powers. The period between the signing of UNCLOS and the end of the 
Cold War was also highly significant because of developments such the 
removal of New Zealand from the ANZUS alliance and the establishment 
of a Quota Management System (QMS).  
Chapter four examines the period between the end of the Cold War and 
the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. While these attacks 
themselves did not have a maritime connection, the effect they had on 
security worldwide was immense. During this period New Zealand made 
significant changes to its Naval Combat Force by decommissioning three 
frigates and commissioning another two. With this came a change in focus 
away from ASW and a marked shift in perspective away from the 
likelihood of interstate warfare towards a focus on stabilisation and peace 
keeping activities. During this period, international fisheries agreements 
were also an important area of development. 
Chapter five assesses the impact that the events of 11 September 2001 
and the following decade have had on maritime security and New 
Zealand‟s regional involvement. This chapter highlights the rising 
importance of piracy and terrorism in maritime security considerations as 
well as the range of international agreements and organisations which 
have been created or adapted to deal with maritime security issues. This 
period also saw a reduction in the naval combat force balanced by a 
considerable increase in the RNZN‟s patrol forces at the end of the 
decade. 
Chapter six uses the knowledge and information gained through the 
previous chapters to make some predictions as to what the future may 
hold. It then suggests how New Zealand should react to such 
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developments and ways in which New Zealand could improve its ability to 
contribute to maritime security at home and in its wider region.  
Methodology 
This thesis is based on qualitative research using primary and secondary 
sources. These include government documents, legislation/legal 
documents, books, journal articles, reports, web pages and conference 
papers. This range of sources provides some first-hand information of 
events and policies as well as the opinions of academics and politicians on 
a range of issues which affect maritime security. The aim of this thesis is 
to bring together this wide range of information and present, in one 
document, a summary of major events regarding New Zealand‟s 
involvement in maritime security. The events and contributions covered in 
this thesis are not an exhaustive list of everything with a maritime security 
element. However, they are selected as the most significant and most 
useful for looking forward to the future and assessing the likelihood of 
future developments and preparing options for dealing with such 
developments. 
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Chapter Two - Pre-UNCLOS, 1945-1982 
Introduction 
At the end of 1945, the strategic situation throughout the world had 
changed dramatically. Importantly for New Zealand, the situation in Asia 
and the Pacific was also very different. The region had been seriously 
impacted by Japan‟s actions during the war and any perceptions of 
security which may have been felt before it were now greatly diminished.  
 
As the world emerged from WWII and began to come to grips with the new 
strategic situation, New Zealand was also forced to re-examine its security 
situation. Traditionally, the support of Great Britain had been central to 
New Zealand‟s defence planning. After the fall of Singapore to the 
Japanese, it became apparent that the Royal Navy (RN) was unable to 
come to the assistance of Pacific countries such as New Zealand.1 New 
Zealand had faced a serious threat of attack on its territory, as well as its 
shipping, from the Japanese Navy and while New Zealand itself was not 
actually attacked, the memory of the threat they had faced was still 
present in people‟s minds. If the United States (US) had not become 
involved in WWII it is highly unlikely that the Western Allies would have 
been able to effectively come to the aid of New Zealand and Australia. The 
Pacific theatre of the war showed quite clearly that New Zealand was 
vulnerable to any threat from a significant naval power in the region. The 
„tyranny of distance‟ meant that New Zealand and Australia were 
effectively outside the sphere of influence of all the western powers, with 
the exception of the US. 
 
Soon after the war ended in 1945, the Cold War began and the world was 
once again required to adjust to a shift in the global competition for power. 
The new rivalry between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) 
                                            
1
 Thomas-Durell Young, Australian, New Zealand, and United States Security Relations, 
1951-1986 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992), p. 1. 
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and the US would have a very real impact on the regions in which New 
Zealand had traditionally been involved, such as Europe, the Middle East 
and the Pacific. Not only was the rivalry between these two world powers 
important, but so was the emerging conflict between communism and 
western capitalism. This conflict greatly affected the Asia region and the 
rivalry between the USSR and the US also spread into the Pacific, 
increasing the likelihood of nations like New Zealand being caught up in 
the conflict.  
 
One of the key factors that influenced New Zealand‟s focus in the period 
after 1945 was Britain‟s desire for New Zealand and Australia to take a 
larger role in the region. After WWII, Britain was faced with the reality that 
they were no longer able to project their power globally; instead, they were 
forced to rely on other countries such as New Zealand and Australia to 
take on some of the responsibilities of the Commonwealth. This realisation 
led Britain to encourage New Zealand and Australia to focus on Southeast 
Asia and the Pacific rather than the Middle East or Europe.2 The new 
emphasis was especially felt when, in the late 1960‟s, Britain decided to 
withdraw its forces east of the Suez Canal, a decision which received 
great opposition from Britain‟s allies in the region. However, the balance of 
power was changing and Britain was no longer able to project the power it 
once had; economic considerations forcing it to reduce its overseas 
deployments. Britain‟s decision led to the abandonment of the existing 
defence arrangement, the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA) of 
1957, and the creation of one of New Zealand‟s most significant defence 
arrangements. This was the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), 
which was negotiated and signed in 1971, by Britain, Australia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, and New Zealand. The FPDA became a significant means of 
connection to the Asian region for New Zealand. 
 
                                            
2
 Malcolm Templeton, Ties of Blood and Empire: New Zealand's Involvement in Middle 
East Defence and the Suez Crisis 1947-57 (Auckland, New Zealand: Auckland University 
Press, 1994), p. 46. 
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Between 1945 and 1982, New Zealand was seeking to develop alliances 
which would eventually become the foundation of its security. Because of 
the small size of New Zealand‟s economy and population, it has never 
been capable of funding or equipping a defence force capable of 
defending its territory without outside help.3 This made alliances such as 
ANZUS (1951), highly valuable to New Zealand because it ensured the 
help and protection of two larger allies, while New Zealand was committed 
to assisting them with what forces it had. During WWII, New Zealand had 
learnt that protection in the Pacific and of New Zealand itself was going to 
depend upon the involvement of the US and the US Navy (USN).4 New 
Zealand‟s involvement in ANZUS, therefore, had local as well as regional 
implications. Other alliances and arrangements created during this period 
include: the Australia, New Zealand, and Malayan Area (ANZAM) which 
was established in 19485; the AMDA of 1957; the South-East Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO) concluded in 19556; and the FPDA.  
New Zealand and Maritime Security 
Naval Strength 
The combat strength of the RNZN varied quite significantly in the decades 
following WWII. During the war, emphasis had been placed on heavily 
armed cruisers which could bring their guns to bear either in a naval 
bombardment of ground forces or against enemy ships. However, as 
submarine technology increased and enemy submarines began to take a 
heavy toll on allied shipping, the benefit, especially after the war, of having 
faster lighter armed ships which could escort convoys and fill an anti-
submarine warfare role became clear. In line with this shift in focus, apart 
from the loan of the HMNZS (Her Majesty‟s New Zealand Ship) Royalist 
                                            
3
 James Rolfe, The Armed Forces of New Zealand (St Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 
1999), p. 13. 
4
 David McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact: Policy-Making, Strategy and 
Diplomacy, 1945-55 (London: Macmillan Press, 1995), p. 12. 
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from 1956 until 1966, the RNZN based its combat force around frigates 
with an ASW capability.7 After 1946 the RNZN still had two Improved Dido 
Class cruisers which were supplemented in 1948 and 1949 with the 
purchase of six Loch Class frigates. During the period between 1948 and 
1982, the RNZN maintained a force which usually consisted of either three 
or four frigates, except for a short period between 1965 and 1966 when 
the last Loch class frigate was paid off and the new Whitby class frigate 
HMNZS Blackpool was commissioned.8  
 
While this decision to move from a cruiser centred force to a frigate 
centred force reduced the combat strength somewhat, it gave the navy the 
ability to carry out roles such as anti-submarine warfare and escort duty 
which had become highly important. Other options were considered to 
provide this capacity, including a fleet of six submarines; however, this 
was rejected based on the expected cost of two billion New Zealand 
dollars.9 The RNZN fleet gave New Zealand the ability to have a naval 
presence both in New Zealand waters as well as abroad if it desired. 
Naval Tasks 
Protection of New Zealand‟s fisheries resources was not a high priority in 
the early post war years. This was influenced by the memory of the two 
world wars and the expectation that the USSR or a resurgent Japan would 
soon be posing a threat to the Pacific and Southeast Asia. During this 
time, therefore, the primary focus was on operating against other navies 
rather than fishing fleets. However, in 1975, after deciding that there was a 
need for a resource protection focus, New Zealand purchased four Lake 
Class fisheries protection patrol craft from Britain.10 The decision on which 
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vessels to purchase was based primarily on economic concerns and 
therefore the four vessels chosen were largely unsuited to their task.11 The 
patrol craft were of a shorter length than was ideal for New Zealand waters 
and subsequently the navy found themselves operating in vessels which 
were inferior to those which they were supposed to be monitoring. 
Because of this, the vessels had a short period of service and the navy 
stopped operating them in the mid-1980‟s. 12  Despite the limitations of 
these vessels, fisheries protection suddenly took on a new dimension with 
the vast increase in the area under New Zealand‟s protection after it 
declared a 200nm EEZ in 1978. 
The SOLAS Convention, 1974 
In response to the Titanic disaster, the international community created 
the first Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) convention. This convention was 
created to regulate the safety of international shipping. There have been 
five versions of the SOLAS Convention, with the last being adopted in 
1974. 13  The new version of the Convention was needed because 
amendments were taking too long to adopt. The 1974 Convention enabled 
changes to be made far more quickly and over the years it has been 
updated with many amendments. This version of the SOLAS Convention 
has become the most important international agreement dealing with the 
safety of international merchant shipping.14 
UNCLOS Negotiations 
During the negotiations for the Third United Nations (UN) Conference on 
the Law of the Sea between 1974 and 1982, it became clear that the 
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principle of a 200nm EEZ was widely supported and almost certain to 
become part of the final convention.15 In line with this, and the actions of 
several other nations throughout the world, New Zealand declared a 
200nm EEZ in 1978.16 This included an area almost 15 times the size of 
New Zealand‟s landmass and represented a highly significant increase in 
the area New Zealand had economic rights to, as well as having to police. 
Because of the highly significant implications of the negotiations taking 
place, New Zealand was very interested in the proceedings of the 
conference. For New Zealand, the focus was on gaining benefits for 
coastal states while ensuring freedom of navigation on the high seas and 
in others‟ EEZ‟s. The end result of the Third UN Conference on the Law of 
the Sea was the signing of UNCLOS in 1982. 
Southeast Asia and Maritime Security 
ANZAM, AMDA and FPDA 
After World War II, New Zealand maintained strong connections to Britain. 
In May 1948, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand formed ANZAM as a 
consultative arrangement for the defence of the south-west Pacific.17 This 
agreement led to New Zealand and Australia being involved in the 
Malayan emergency between 1948 and 1960. Furthermore, when Malaya 
became independent in 1957, the AMDA was signed.18 This agreement 
meant that Britain, New Zealand, and Australia, accepted the burden of 
responsibility for the defence of Malaya and later the Malaysian 
Federation. When Indonesia launched its policy of confrontation following 
the formation of the Malaysian Federation, the AMDA was activated and 
Britain maintained its commitment to defend Malaysia. However, it was 
under the auspices of ANZAM that New Zealand and Australia, through 
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the avenue of the British-led Commonwealth Strategic Reserve, were 
involved in defending Malaysia against Indonesian aggression.19  
 
After the end of confrontation in 1966, Britain began to rethink its military 
commitments. It informed New Zealand, Australia and their other allies that 
they were withdrawing their forces east of the Suez Canal. The decision to 
withdraw was forced by economic factors as well as by Britain‟s decline as 
a world power. As Britain accepted the reality that it could no longer 
maintain the global presence it had once had, it was forced to concentrate 
on those areas where it could still afford to be involved.20 This meant its 
focus moved away from Southeast Asia and the Pacific to the NATO area 
and Europe.  
 
Britain‟s decision was significant for New Zealand and Australia as they 
were now losing the support of their premier historical ally. It was even 
more significant for Malaysia and Singapore, who were potentially losing 
the guarantor of their security. In response to these concerns, Britain 
sought to reassure these allies and to provide some continuing support in 
the area of security. While Britain was willing to continue to assist in 
securing their allies in the region, they were no longer willing to carry the 
majority of the burden for this security. In response to this, in April 1971, 
representatives of the five nations (Britain, Australia, New Zealand, 
Malaysia, and Singapore) met in London to discuss a new security 
arrangement. The end result was the FPDA.21 
 
The FPDA did not provide the same guarantee of security that had existed 
previously through AMDA. Instead, the FPDA was only a commitment to 
consult if one of the members was attacked or under threat of attack. After 
the FPDA was adopted, AMDA was abandoned, releasing Britain from its 
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major security commitment.22 As this change in focus by Britain continued, 
ANZAM‟s performance faded and it was eventually abandoned in 1974. 
This left the FPDA as the only significant remaining security arrangement 
between these five nations, and for New Zealand it was the only major 
avenue for involvement in the security of Malaysia and Singapore.23 New 
Zealand had until this point relied on being involved with Britain rather than 
having an independent involvement. This slow easing away from security 
commitments was another event which further confirmed to both New 
Zealand and Australia that Britain was no longer the world power she once 
was and could not be relied upon to guarantee their security. 24  Joint 
exercises as part of the FPDA did not occur until 1981, when a minor 
maritime exercise took place with only eight ships involved. This exercise 
was widely seen as a failure and further undermined the value of the 
FPDA.25  
SEATO 
SEATO was formed in 1954 and was the culmination of different efforts by 
a number of its member nations to create an alliance which would ensure 
the security of South-East Asia and the Western Pacific. Eight nations 
were members of SEATO: the United States, Britain, France, Australia, 
New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines.26 For New Zealand, 
it was an opportunity to strengthen the security guarantees provided 
through agreements such as ANZUS, but most importantly it brought 
together New Zealand‟s two most powerful allies - the United States and 
Britain. New Zealand had supported Britain‟s efforts to become involved 
with ANZUS for many years but the US had always declined.27  
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This opportunity to be involved with a range of different, and in some 
cases powerful, militaries was highly valuable. 28  SEATO also ensured 
New Zealand‟s involvement in exercises which enabled the armed forces 
to improve their skills through training with their vastly experienced and 
well-equipped allies. Another benefit was the standardisation of equipment 
which would make any joint future involvement in conflict less difficult.  
 
New Zealand affirmed its commitment to SEATO in 1962 by sending a 
frigate, along with other New Zealand forces, to Thailand in an effort by 
SEATO to show their determination to repel any attack across the Thai 
border.29  However, as time progressed, it became clear that SEATO‟s 
primary focus in securing South-East Asia would be through attempts to 
counter subversion by communist forces. This did not require New 
Zealand‟s armed forces‟ involvement, particularly its navy, and thus New 
Zealand‟s enthusiasm for SEATO waned. While no military action involving 
New Zealand was undertaken under the auspices of SEATO, the 
organisation was valuable for the experience gained and the relationships 
strengthened. A different perspective, offered by Pearson, was that 
“SEATO, however, was the linchpin joining the ANZUS guarantees with 
the standing ANZAM military arrangements in a strategy of forward 
defence for New Zealand”.30 If that was indeed the case, then SEATO‟s 
benefits extended beyond the experience and skills gained through 
involvement with other militaries. SEATO also confirmed to New Zealand 
that its national interests could only be protected with the involvement of 
America and Britain.  
Cold War Concerns 
New Zealand‟s involvement in SEATO was representative of its wider 
opposition to the spread of communism. This included New Zealand 
involvement in the Korean War, sending troops to Vietnam and a general 
                                            
28
 Pearson, p. 73. 
29
 Pearson, p. 93. 
30
 Pearson, p. 43. 
 17 
 
opposition, through organisations previously mentioned (such as SEATO), 
to the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. Although New Zealand 
was wary of the potential of China becoming heavily involved in the region, 
the bigger threat to New Zealand‟s security was likely to come from the 
USSR and its attempts to counter US naval dominance. While the US was 
obviously the dominant navy in the region, New Zealand played a role in 
the Western Alliance by maintaining a significant anti-submarine warfare 
capability in order to be able to monitor and, if necessary, sink Soviet 
submarines operating in the waters of the region.31 This capability also 
gave the RNZN the option of escorting valuable shipping should there be a 
perceived risk of attack from Soviet submarines. Some of the lessons of 
WWII had been learned, and the risk of New Zealand‟s shipping being cut 
off was a fearful prospect for a nation that was so isolated.32 The Soviet 
submarines appeared to become a primary concern when the decision 
was made to move from basing the naval combat force around cruisers, to 
that of several faster frigates, able to patrol large areas, escort shipping, 
and conduct ASW. 
The Pacific and Maritime Security 
NZ Territories 
New Zealand was strongly connected to the Pacific between 1945 and 
1982 because of its responsibility for the security of Niue, Tokelau, the 
Cook Islands and Western Samoa.33 This responsibility meant that New 
Zealand needed to maintain at least a minor naval presence from time to 
time in order to protect these countries‟ interests. However, as with New 
Zealand‟s ability to defend its own territory, this presence alone would not 
have been sufficient to defeat a serious attack by any significant military 
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force.34 The primary role New Zealand played in terms of maritime security 
was to protect and patrol the waters of these territories. This was primarily 
fisheries and resource protection, although it also included monitoring for 
other illegal activity.35 In 1962, Western Samoa gained its independence 
and with it responsibility for its own security. However, New Zealand has 
remained involved at some level in the maritime security of Samoa.36  The 
Cook Islands37 and Niue38 are self-governing states in free association 
with New Zealand, while Tokelau remains a dependent territory. New 
Zealand is still responsible for their defence and security. 
ANZUS 
Another highly significant involvement in regional maritime security was 
New Zealand‟s membership in the ANZUS alliance. This alliance was 
formed in 1951 in the aftermath of World War II. The US was looking for 
support for the Japanese peace treaty from New Zealand and Australia, 
who were particularly sceptical after the threat they faced from Japan 
during the war. New Zealand and Australia were looking to the US for a 
guarantee of intervention should any country, including Japan, seek to 
threaten their security in the future.39 It has also been argued that the US 
wanted to link New Zealand and Australia to the defence of US troops in 
Asia should they be attacked. It has been suggested that New Zealand 
and Australia were in part responding to their disappointment at being 
excluded from the western alliance which at the time was seen as being 
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embodied by NATO.40 Thus, ANZUS was a means for both countries to 
connect themselves formally with the largest of the western powers. This 
alliance was also a further acknowledgement by New Zealand and 
Australia that their traditional ties with Britain were no longer sufficient to 
guarantee their security.41 They acknowledged that America was now the 
major power in the Pacific and therefore they decided to align themselves 
strongly with America in return for a guarantee of their safety. The alliance 
progressed throughout the Cold War period, and pressure from the US 
resulted in New Zealand involvement in conflicts such as the Vietnam War 
and also in countering Soviet attempts to spread its influence into the 
region.42 One of New Zealand‟s major contributions was maintaining a 
significant ASW capability with its frigates and P-3K Orion maritime patrol 
aircraft. Membership of ANZUS also provided an opportunity for New 
Zealand troops to exercise and train with their counterparts in both 
Australia and the US which was an important way for New Zealand‟s 
defence force to maintain high standards.43 The opportunity for the RNZN 
to train with a navy with the size and sophistication of the US Navy was 
rare and was an excellent way to sharpen their skills. These exercises 
also meant that the two navies had experience working together and, 
should they be involved in a conflict situation, this experience would aid 
interoperability.  
New Zealand Opposition to French Nuclear Testing in the Pacific 
There was a certain level of public opposition within New Zealand from the 
very first announcement that France was moving its nuclear weapons 
testing from Africa to the Pacific. This objection to French testing became 
a significant issue for the Labour party in the mid-1960s.44 Opposition to 
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French nuclear testing in the Pacific grew to the point where, when the 
Labour party came to power in 1972, they combined with Australia to take 
the French to court. The two countries took France to the International 
Criminal Court and received an interim injunction against testing while the 
case was considered. France subsequently ignored the court ruling and 
continued to test on the grounds that matters of defence were outside the 
court‟s jurisdiction.45 In response, New Zealand sent the frigate HMNZS 
Otago and a cabinet minister to Moruroa in protest of the continuing 
tests.46 While tests continued despite the frigates‟ presence, in 1974 the 
French Government announced that subsequent tests at Moruroa would 
change from atmospheric to underground detonations.47 This was small 
consolation for New Zealand and the Pacific nations in their fight to 
prevent France from polluting the Pacific and endangering lives. 
Mutual Assistance Programme 
In 1973 New Zealand established the Mutual Assistance Programme 
(MAP) of military cooperation with Pacific Island and Southeast Asian 
states.48 It was first established with Fiji, Tonga, Papua New Guinea and 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states and spread to 
other nations as well.49 This programme saw New Zealand provide training 
and other assistance to the armed forces of selected Pacific nations in 
return for access to those states‟ territories for training purposes which 
gave New Zealand a tropical location to expand the range of conditions its 
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troops had experience operating in.50 This involvement provided valuable 
links with the armed forces of New Zealand‟s Pacific neighbours and also 
opportunities to contribute to the security of the wider region. 
Pacific EEZ Patrols 
One of the valuable ways in which New Zealand was able to contribute to 
Pacific Island nations‟ maritime security was through patrols of their EEZs. 
After it became apparent that the UN negotiations were likely to support 
the concept of a 200nm EEZ, many nations worldwide declared extended 
EEZs even before UNCLOS was signed. The decision by many Pacific 
Island governments to declare a 200nm EEZ meant that they then had 
vast areas of territory which they needed to manage and protect if they 
were to experience the full benefits.51 Most island nations did not have the 
aircraft required to patrol this area and, as such, their small fleet of boats 
would often have little chance of catching anyone now fishing illegally in 
their waters. At the request of individual Pacific Island nations, New 
Zealand and Australia agreed to undertake maritime air patrols of those 
Islands‟ EEZs and report any suspicious activity they observed. These 
reports then enabled vessels to be sent from the Islands to investigate.52 
The surveillance efforts were primarily undertaken by the Royal Australian 
Air Force (RAAF) and RNZAF P-3K Orion maritime patrol aircraft, although 
RAN and RNZN vessels also took part occasionally.53 This was a highly 
valued contribution to the maritime security of the Pacific and helped to 
build strong relations between New Zealand and the smaller Pacific Island 
nations.  
The Forum Fisheries Agency 
In August 1979, in an attempt to enhance their collective ability to manage 
and protect their valuable fish stocks, the members of the South Pacific 
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Forum established the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA).54 The members 
had recognised, along with many other countries around the world, some 
of the implications of the emerging trend towards declaring 200nm EEZs. 
The newly acquired resources which had come under the control of these 
nations needed to be managed, developed and protected. The dangers of 
the over-exploitation of these valuable fishing resources and especially the 
actions of distant water fishing nations created the need for a coordinated 
effort from the Pacific Island nations.55 The most significant fish stock in 
the region was that of the highly migratory southern bluefin tuna (SBT) 
which had important commercial value. The Forum nations desired a 
coordinated approach to the issue of EEZs and the securing of the living 
resources contained within. High importance was placed on coordinating 
the approaches of all forum members in order to aid the collective 
management of fisheries resources. 56  Functions of the FFA include 
collecting and analysing data on fish stocks and publishing the results for 
the benefit of all members, sharing information on management 
procedures and relevant legislation and providing technical advice and 
assistance to any forum member who requests it.57 The FFA also sought 
to establish good working relationships with local and international 
organisations to aid cooperation. From these relatively humble beginnings 
has grown a highly important organisation which has played an important 
role in the management of Pacific fisheries and has, over the years, 
implemented further initiatives which have contributed to the security of 
Pacific fisheries. 
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Conclusion 
During the period between the end of WWII and the signing of UNCLOS, 
New Zealand was faced with a changing international situation and the 
diminished importance of its once certain notions of Commonwealth 
defence. New Zealand was forced to shift its focus from events in Europe 
and the Middle East to events occurring closer to home. Southeast Asia 
and the Pacific became more important in New Zealand‟s security 
considerations. The focus of the RNZN shifted from maintaining a fleet 
based around heavily armed cruisers to a highly mobile fleet of anti-
submarine warfare frigates capable of escorting shipping, monitoring 
submarines and patrolling the newly acquired EEZs of New Zealand and 
her territories.  
 
New Zealand was also on the search for allies and outside assurances of 
its security. Faced with the fact that it could not realistically defend itself 
against attack, the government was compelled to seek undertakings from 
other stronger nations that they would provide the security which New 
Zealand could not provide itself. After World War II it became clear that 
Britain would no longer be able to project its power into Southeast Asia 
and down to the Pacific in defence of its former colonies. In the 1960‟s the 
shift in New Zealand‟s focus from Britain to the US was clear. New 
Zealand sought to be involved in a series of regional arrangements in 
order to fulfil its new found obligations as Britain sought to withdraw and 
also to increase its own security. It was acknowledged that any defence of 
New Zealand must begin offshore.  
 
With the progress made in negotiations over UNCLOS it became clear that 
a 200nm EEZ was to become an internationally accepted principle. Along 
with many other nations, New Zealand declared its own EEZ, resulting in 
rights to, and responsibility for, a vast sea area which it also needed to 
protect. Early attempts at significant fisheries protection were hampered 
by economic decisions which resulted in the navy purchasing ships which 
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were unsuited to the New Zealand sea conditions. Fortunately, future 
measures to ensure fisheries protection were more appropriate.  
New Zealand‟s involvement in maritime security in Southeast Asia was 
centred on alliances and multilateral agreements. These ranged from 
focused agreements such as ANZAM, AMDA and the FPDA, which dealt 
with the provision of security for a narrow geographic area, through to 
SEATO and general Cold War concerns, which saw New Zealand involved 
(at least in the planning sense) for the provision of security for a large 
region. All of these measures connected New Zealand to friendly states in 
a form of collective security which New Zealand had sought from the UN 
but had begun to realise was unlikely to materialise.  
New Zealand had strong connections to the Pacific region both because of 
its presence in the region, and because of its obligations to its territories 
and smaller northern neighbours. New Zealand was responsible for the 
defence of Western Samoa up until 1962 and continues to be responsible 
for Niue, Tokelau and the Cook Islands. New Zealand was also strongly 
linked to the defence of the Pacific region through the trilateral ANZUS 
alliance with Australia and America. This alliance was the premier 
guarantee of maritime security within the Pacific region. The USN was 
preeminent in the region, and connection to the US Navy provided the 
RNZN with valuable training and experience, as well as the assurance of 
support should an attack occur. New Zealand was also involved in aiding 
its Pacific neighbours through initiatives such as the MAP which provided 
military training and assistance to regional militaries. As part of its efforts 
to contribute to the maritime security of the Pacific Region, New Zealand 
carried out EEZ patrols for many of the Pacific Islands who were not 
capable of adequately patrolling their newly acquired territory. This 
involved air patrols by Air Force Orions as well as the occasional patrol by 
various naval vessels. Finally, New Zealand was involved in the 
establishment and running of the FFA which sought to promote 
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cooperation and effective management and protection of Pacific Island 
Fisheries.  
During this period New Zealand was forced to adapt to international 
events and shifts in power as they occurred or became clear. New 
Zealand was involved in a range of efforts to promote maritime security 
which ranged from traditional naval activities to fisheries management. 
With the signing of UNCLOS in 1982, the international maritime 
environment changed once again and the world would have to adapt to 
gain the full benefits. UNCLOS represented formal recognition of the 
emerging new ideas which would soon become accepted international 
norms. UNCLOS ensured a vast increase in rights to maritime resources 
from previous international norms and thus would change the way in which 
nations would interact. Countries who once had an area of jurisdiction 
which was hundreds of kilometres apart, now found themselves having to 
negotiate new delimitation agreements. The geopolitical landscape had 
changed dramatically and New Zealand, like the rest of the world, would 
have to adjust. 
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Chapter Three - From UNCLOS to the End of the 
Cold War, 1982-1990 
Introduction 
In 1982, after decades of negotiations, the maritime legal landscape was 
changed forever. With the final signing of UNCLOS, a new and expansive 
legal regime was established with regard to the maritime realm. From 
1982 to 19901 countries were seeking to adjust to this changed landscape. 
This nine year period was highly significant for New Zealand‟s maritime 
security.  
As a result of UNCLOS and the need to protect the newly acquired 
maritime resources, New Zealand implemented a world leading fisheries 
protection regime in the form of the QMS.2 Furthermore, tensions between 
the United States and New Zealand resulted in the US-New Zealand leg of 
ANZUS being declared inoperable.3 New Zealand was also shocked into 
an awareness of maritime terrorism issues with the bombing of the 
Greenpeace vessel the Rainbow Warrior.4 This period also saw the RNZN 
update its frigate fleet, as well as beginning a somewhat controversial joint 
project with Australia on the construction of a new class of frigate. 
Wider developments during this period included the withdrawal of New 
Zealand forces from Singapore, the signing of the IMO Convention on the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 
(SUA Convention), the establishment of the South Pacific Nuclear Free 
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Zone (SPNFZ) and New Zealand‟s accession to the 1979 International 
Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue. Other contributions to 
maritime security during this time included fisheries protection both in New 
Zealand waters as well as in the Pacific, New Zealand‟s continued 
involvement in the FPDA and associated exercises, the further 
development of the MAP, and military exercises with a wider range of 
partners. 
New Zealand and Maritime Security 
The years 1982 to 1990 were highly significant for New Zealand‟s 
maritime security. This period saw the completion and signing of UNCLOS 
which was responsible for a major increase in the maritime area that 
states were responsible for. New Zealand emerged with responsibility for 
one of the largest regions in the world. In 1986, New Zealand put into 
place a QMS to ensure the sustainable and profitable management of its 
fisheries stocks. The QMS was one of the most comprehensive fisheries 
systems in the world and it established a mechanism through which future 
management of this valuable resource could be achieved. 
During the early part of this period, growing anti-nuclear sentiment in New 
Zealand led to increased tension between New Zealand and the US over 
the nuclear status (both powered and armed) of the USN‟s ships. The 
tension reached its peak in 1985 with the US-New Zealand leg of the 
ANZUS alliance being declared inoperable, ending New Zealand‟s premier 
security alliance and its most valuable guarantee of maritime security.  
These three issues were each highly significant to New Zealand‟s maritime 
security and, as such, each in its own way changed the way New Zealand 
perceived its maritime environment. 
UNCLOS 
In 1982, after years of negotiations and three Law of the Sea conferences, 
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea was finally finished and 
available for signature. New Zealand was one of many nations involved in 
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the negotiations and was highly interested in the outcome. The convention 
was a comprehensive legal document which established the accepted 
principles and laws which were to govern much of state behaviour in the 
maritime realm. As mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the most 
significant provisions of the treaty was the acceptance of the 200nm EEZ.5 
However, the treaty also included provisions dealing with the navigation 
and transit rights of ships travelling on the high seas as well as through 
EEZs and important straits. 6  UNCLOS dealt with jurisdiction over 
economic resources such as fisheries and minerals, and included 
controversial provisions with regard to mineral resources beneath the high 
seas.7 Because of the nature of the new laws with regard to jurisdiction 
over areas which had previously been considered high seas, it was 
considered likely that conflicts would ensue. Because of this, provisions 
were also included on dispute settlement and the rights of states to restrict 
certain activities within their EEZ or territorial waters.8 
Despite the large support the convention received during drafting and 
through the signing process, it did not receive the same support with 
regard to ratifications of signatures. The Convention would enter into law 
twelve months after it received the 60th ratification. This, however, did not 
occur until over a decade later, with the convention finally entering into 
force on 16 November 1994, almost 12 years after it was first opened for 
signature.9 This long period between signature and ratification was largely 
due to disagreements, led by objections from the US, over provisions with 
regard to deep seabed mining. The US was unhappy with the restrictions 
which were placed on seabed mining and the fact that UNCLOS called for 
the establishment of an international body with control over the activity.10 
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UNCLOS would also have forced the US to share mining technology with 
other nations as well as the proceeds of their mining efforts. The US 
decided that, although it supported the majority of other areas covered 
within UNCLOS, the seabed mining issues went so strongly against their 
national interest they could not sign the treaty.11 This left the rest of the 
world with a hard decision to make: would they continue with the 
convention without US involvement, or seek to make accommodations 
which would placate the US and entice them to sign the treaty? In the end 
a further annex (annex XI) was proposed with the hope of addressing the 
issues which the US had raised, but the US is still unwilling to sign 
UNCLOS. They have, however, claimed that the rest of the provisions of 
UNCLOS are consistent with customary international law and therefore the 
US enjoys the rights and benefits under other areas of UNCLOS through 
customary international law.12 
New Zealand was one of the many nations who were quick to sign 
UNCLOS on its completion, but were very slow to ratify it. In fact, New 
Zealand did not ratify UNCLOS (and annex XI on deep seabed mining) 
until 19 July 1996. New Zealand‟s reasons for not ratifying the treaty 
earlier were, like many nations, because of concerns about the provisions 
in the treaty which addressed deep seabed mining and also the US 
unwillingness to sign because of these provisions.13 New Zealand made 
the decision to ratify UNCLOS after matters were addressed through the 
creation of annex XI and its entry into force definitively in 1996.14  
Although slow to ratify it, New Zealand actually stood to make huge gains 
through the provisions of UNCLOS despite many of these provisions 
already being claimed through the establishment of a 200nm EEZ in 
1977. 15  With the entry into force of UNCLOS in 1994, all of these 
provisions were now set firmly in international law rather than up for 
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debate as to their status as customary international law. New Zealand‟s 
rights had significantly increased, but along with this its responsibilities 
had also increased, particularly when its Pacific obligations to Niue, 
Tokelau and the Cook Islands were included. 
Quota Management System 
In 1986, New Zealand implemented a world-leading fisheries management 
program which brought New Zealand‟s fisheries under government control 
and allowed for greater emphasis on conservation.16 The QMS‟s central 
feature was that the government set the total allowable catch (TAC) at the 
start of each year, thus limiting the quantity of fish which could be caught 
during that given year. The rights to catch these fish were then divided up 
into individual transferable quotas (ITQs) which were given to fishing 
vessel owners based on historic catch levels from 1982-1984.17 In order to 
reduce the volume of fish caught from the historic level to the newly-set 
TAC, the government purchased the rights to the fish which made up the 
difference. 18  This process continued each year with the government 
adjusting the TAC and then purchasing the rights to the fish it wished to be 
left uncaught. This changed in 1990 when the government adjusted the 
ITQs to be a proportion of the TAC rather than a set volume of fish.19 
There were several important benefits to the introduction of the QMS. 
Firstly, it ensured that there was no race to catch as many fish as possible 
during the season. Nor was there a need to try and race against other 
fishermen as the ITQs ensured that the holder was legally entitled to catch 
their allotted amount and thus they could take their time in doing so.20 
Another benefit of the QMS was that it allowed the government to adjust 
the TAC each year in order to control levels of certain species and to allow 
for the rebuilding of stocks that had been depleted. The QMS also set out 
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different fisheries management areas (FMAs) within which fishing was to 
take place. The government had the ability to limit or halt fishing of certain 
species within these FMAs if a certain species was being overfished.21 
This system allowed not only country-wide conservation of commercial fish 
stocks but also management of local populations as well. Finally, in an 
attempt to protect certain areas, whether for their high ecological value or 
in order to rebuild fish stocks, certain areas could be closed to all fishing.22 
These efforts not only ensured that New Zealand‟s fisheries resources 
were not overfished, but they also went a long way to ensuring a highly 
valuable, sustainable commercial fishing industry for New Zealand. 
Fisheries management was one element of maritime security where New 
Zealand was at the forefront in the late 1980s.  
ANZUS 
In the early 1980s, anti-nuclear feelings within New Zealand were 
growing.23 The Labour party, acknowledging the opinions of both members 
of the public as well as party members, took up port visits by nuclear 
powered or armed ships as a campaign issue in the 1984 election. Upon 
winning the election, the government implemented a policy banning all 
ships that were either nuclear powered or carrying nuclear weapons.24 
This decision caused tension with New Zealand‟s primary ally, the United 
States. While much of the US fleet is not nuclear powered, US policy was 
to neither confirm nor deny whether any given vessel was nuclear armed. 
The US was unwilling to change this policy and believed that by refusing 
to accept port visits by US ships, New Zealand was defaulting on its 
obligations under ANZUS.25 In an attempt to smooth things over and prove 
that the two allies could still work together, discussions were held and 
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eventually the USS (United States Ship) Buchanan was selected to make 
a port visit to New Zealand. As an ageing, conventionally-powered frigate, 
the USS Buchanan, was accepted as not being nuclear powered. 
However, because it was technically nuclear weapons capable (it could 
carry nuclear depth charges) and the US Government refused to state 
whether or not it was carrying nuclear weapons, the decision was made by 
the New Zealand Government to refuse the arranged visit. 26  This 
surprising decision came after intense pressure from lobby groups within 
New Zealand. After all the effort that had been made to select an 
acceptable ship for the visit, the US took this as the final insult and ended 
all joint military training and exercise ties. One US official‟s comment 
clearly shows the feelings which surrounded the issue, particularly the 
American feeling of betrayal: "He [Lange] may not be able to imagine that 
(the United States would refuse to help New Zealand in an emergency), 
but it's hard for us to imagine that New Zealand would not allow our ships 
into its ports".27  
The break between New Zealand and the US meant that New Zealand 
was no longer able to exercise with its largest ally. Despite assertions from 
the Labour Party that New Zealand had lost nothing, the loss of these 
training opportunities alone hampered New Zealand‟s armed forces and 
particularly its navy.28 While ANZUS continues today, it is no longer a 
strictly trilateral security alliance with the US-New Zealand leg of ANZUS 
now defunct. The ending of this relationship had ramifications for New 
Zealand‟s involvement in maritime security not only in its own territory, but 
also throughout Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Because of this dispute 
New Zealand‟s status with the US was downgraded from that of an ally to 
a friendly nation, which was a clear sign of Washington‟s displeasure and 
it resulted in New Zealand losing special preference status when 
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purchasing arms from the US. 29  This had the effect of forcing New 
Zealand to look elsewhere for future arms purchases and thus New 
Zealand drifted further away from the premier western superpower only 
years before the end of the Cold War and America‟s ascension to the 
status of the world‟s sole superpower. Also, with the end of all joint military 
training and exercise ties, New Zealand was either excluded from many 
exercises that involved the US or the US refused to participate in them, 
which undermined the significance of these exercises and led New 
Zealand to look to other nations for training and exercise opportunities. 30 
The result of this was that New Zealand was pushed closer to Australia 
and to its Southeast Asian FPDA associates.31 New Zealand‟s Navy was 
particularly affected by the loss of the opportunity to exercise with the 
world‟s premier navy and the technology and expertise which this exposed 
them to.  
The Rainbow Warrior 
Public opinion continued to mount against French nuclear testing in the 
Pacific and protests against this continued to be led by Greenpeace. In 
July 1985, while Greenpeace was preparing another protest voyage to 
Moruroa, New Zealand experienced its very own maritime terrorist 
attack.32 On 10 July, the Greenpeace vessel, the Rainbow Warrior, was 
bombed while tied up alongside Marsden Wharf in Auckland harbour, 
killing one crew member. Two mines were attached to its hull by divers 
who were working for the French secret service, the Direction Générale de 
la Sécurité Extérieure or General Directorate of External Security 
(DGSE).33 The Rainbow Warrior and several other yachts were to have 
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been involved in a flotilla protesting against French nuclear testing at 
Moruroa Atoll in the South Pacific. New Zealand‟s Government declared 
the attack an act of state-sponsored terrorism, although the governments 
of France, Britain and the US were quick to deny that this was the case. 
However, they were reluctant to explain what it might have been instead. 
While those involved in the bombing who have spoken claim that there 
was no intention to kill anyone, this ignores the fact that the placing of the 
mines meant that it was only because several members of the crew were 
not on board that their lives were not lost.34 The outrage over this attack 
was a strong motivation for New Zealand to be involved in the creation of 
the SPNFZ later that year, and the SUA Convention several years later.35 
Naval Strength and Fisheries Protection 
The period between 1982 and 1990 was significant for the RNZN in terms 
of new vessels acquired and old vessels decommissioned. During this 
time the two Rothesay class frigates were decommissioned with HMNZS 
Taranaki leaving service in June 1982 and HMNZS Otago in November 
1983.36  These were replaced with the final two Leander class frigates 
HMNZS Wellington in October 1982 and HMNZS Southland in December 
1983.37 Hence, the navy consisted of a combat fleet of four frigates for 
almost the entire period while only decreasing to three for short periods 
between the decommissioning of one frigate and the commissioning of its 
replacement. This kept the force strength high and within the desired limits 
to carry out the navy‟s expected role.  
In the mid-to-late 1980s, New Zealand and Australia entered into 
negotiations over the construction of new frigates in Australia.38 Two of the 
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initial frigates would be purchased by New Zealand and the rest would go 
to Australia with New Zealand having the option of purchasing two more at 
a later stage.39 This project to build the ANZAC class frigates was met with 
strong opposition within New Zealand especially with regards to the cost 
and suitability of the frigate designs chosen. One of the objections was 
that New Zealand did not need frigates but, rather, patrol vessels which 
were capable of patrolling New Zealand‟s waters for fisheries protection 
and similar roles.40 In the end, any objections were overcome and the 
Labour Government proceeded with the project, signing the contract on 10 
November 1989. This project would see in excess of NZ$800 million of the 
cost being contracted to New Zealand firms.41 Construction of the two 
frigates did not begin until well into the 1990s and their final delivery and 
commissioning did not take place until the late 1990s.42 
Also during the mid-1980s, the navy was forced to retire the four Lake 
class patrol boats due to their inadequacy to meet their fisheries patrol 
requirements.43 As mentioned in the previous chapter, these vessels were 
chosen primarily on economic grounds and were not suited to the 
conditions in New Zealand, leaving them less capable than many of the 
ships they were intended to monitor. Between 1983 and 1985 four Weka 
class Inshore Patrol Craft were purchased and used by the RNZN 
volunteer reserve for training purposes and some fisheries patrols.44 This, 
however, did not replace the loss of capability with regard to fisheries 
patrol, particularly after the Lake class patrol boats were removed from 
active service.45 Considering New Zealand‟s EEZ was now 200nm from its 
coast and one of the largest in the world, the navy was stretched to patrol 
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this area with only the four Leander class frigates effectively able to patrol 
out to the 200nm limit.46 
Southeast Asia and Maritime Security 
During the period between the signing of UNCLOS in 1982 and the end of 
the Cold War in 1990, New Zealand was not heavily involved in Southeast 
Asian maritime security in any immediate way. New Zealand‟s involvement 
primarily consisted of participation in the FPDA and associated exercises 
as well being a part of international agreements and treaties which were 
signed and had ramifications for the region as well as the rest of the world. 
As well as the implications of UNCLOS which have been discussed earlier, 
the signing of the SUA convention had a significant impact on maritime 
security both in Southeast Asia and around the globe. 
FPDA 
Although between 1982 and 1990 the FPDA continued to be in operation, 
in reality little was achieved. Mutual suspicions between Singapore and 
Malaysia made organising exercises difficult and all three non-Southeast 
Asian nations were looking to remove their forces from the region following 
the Vietnam War. New Zealand withdrew its sole infantry battalion in 
1989.47 It was not until 1989 that tension and suspicion between these two 
nations was able to be overcome and bilateral land exercises were held in 
East Malaysia.48 This existing tension, as well as the lack of a real threat 
to the security of these two nations, meant that the FPDA was not 
considered an important contribution to security in Southeast Asia and 
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therefore was not progressed. There were thus few opportunities for New 
Zealand to be involved in the maritime security of Southeast Asia. 
The IMO Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against 
the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988 
In October 1985, the Achille Lauro, an Italian cruise liner sailing in the 
Mediterranean Sea off the coast of Egypt, was hijacked by four men who 
claimed to be part of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. During the 
standoff, the men shot an American passenger and threw his body 
overboard. After a period of several days, they surrendered to Egyptian 
officials on the understanding they would be able to return to the 
Palestinian territories. On leaving Egypt their plane was intercepted and 
forced to land in Sicily by the US Air Force. The men were arrested by 
Italian officials and charged over the attack on the Achille Lauro. Italy, 
however, declined US requests for extradition. This incident highlighted 
the lack of specific international law regarding terrorist attacks at sea and 
especially any understanding of who would have jurisdiction should the 
terrorists be caught.49 
Following the events onboard the Achille Lauro, the international 
community sought to establish a convention to address terrorist attacks at 
sea. After the attack was heavily condemned within the UN General 
Assembly, it was decided to turn the drafting of a convention to deal with 
such events over to the IMO.50 The negotiations involved 79 countries 
from around the world, with varying opinions on many different parts of the 
agreement. The resulting agreement not only covered terrorism at sea but 
also the use of violence by any party which endangered the life of any 
individual or the safety of the ship itself. This convention also carried the 
obligation for all states to address the act if it occurred under their 
jurisdiction. Furthermore, it set out procedures and requirements for 
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extradition should the accused be arrested in a state which does not have 
jurisdiction or wishes to defer to another state that has jurisdiction and 
wishes to prosecute. 
New Zealand was actively involved in the negotiations, and one of its 
suggestions was included when it was made a primary offence to damage 
navigational facilities or interfere with their operation such that it 
endangers a ship or ships.51 Despite New Zealand‟s active involvement in 
the negotiations, they were not one of the 23 countries who signed at the 
conference in March 1988, instead waiting until December 1988.52 The 
convention came into effect in March 1992 after receiving the required 15 
ratifications. The SUA convention did not come into effect for New Zealand 
until 1999, when the New Zealand Parliament passed legislation which 
made the provisions of the convention part of New Zealand law.53 
The Pacific and Maritime Security 
The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone 
In August 1985, after years of suggestions and discussion over the idea of 
a nuclear free zone for the South Pacific, eight nations of the South Pacific 
Forum signed the SPNFZ Treaty, also known as the Rarotonga Treaty. 
This treaty was finally completed after the Australian Labour Government 
took the initiative. New Zealand and other Pacific countries had proposed 
a similar idea in previous years, but without Australia‟s support they had 
made little headway. 54  New Zealand and seven other Pacific nations 
signed the treaty on 6 August 1985 and it came into force on 11 December 
1986.55  
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The Rarotonga Treaty banned the manufacture, acquisition, possession, 
testing, control or deployment of nuclear weapons by any state who was a 
signatory. It also prohibited the permanent stationing of nuclear weapons 
by the nuclear powers within the territory of any of the parties to the 
treaty.56 Further prohibitions under the treaty were: the use or threat of use 
of nuclear weapons by the nuclear powers against the zone, peaceful 
nuclear explosions, and the disposal of nuclear waste within the territorial 
sea or high seas. This treaty did not restrict the transit of nuclear-powered 
or nuclear-armed vessels through the region, nor did it restrict port calls or 
landings. 57 Protocol I of the treaty encouraged France, Britain and the US 
to apply these restrictions to their territories within the region and Protocol 
III was aimed at gaining the agreement of all the nuclear powers not to test 
nuclear weapons within the region.58 France was the only state carrying 
out tests at this point and was clearly the intended subject of this protocol.  
The area this treaty covers extends from the equator south to the northern 
boundary of the Antarctic Treaty zone, east to the western boundary of the 
Tlatelolco Treaty zone, and west to the western boundary of Australian 
continental territory (Australia‟s territories in the Indian Ocean are included 
until such time as an Indian Ocean Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty is 
established).59 One thing to note about the geographic area of this treaty is 
that it does not include all members of the South Pacific Commission, as 
some members such as Belau, the Federated States of Micronesia, 
Marshall Islands, Northern Marianas, and Guam are all north of the 
equator.60 This was done in order to increase the likelihood of support 
from the US, who subsequently only has its territory of American Samoa 
within the treaty area. 
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The biggest gains of this treaty were dependent on the attitudes taken by 
the nuclear powers. If the treaty was accepted by all the nuclear powers 
then it would have increased the security of the region. However, their lack 
of support for the treaty (particularly that of the United States, Britain and 
France) meant that it merely affected the actions of those nations within 
the region who were less likely to have endangered their own region‟s 
security in the first place.61 
One of the important restrictions of this treaty for the immediate maritime 
environment was banning the dumping of nuclear waste at sea. While this 
was significant with regard to the territorial sea of the signatories, the 
treaty did not include anything which would prevent non-signatories from 
dumping nuclear waste on the high seas within the treaty zone. This 
undermined the significance of this prohibition, given that the states who 
were party to this treaty did not generate large amounts of waste which 
needed disposing of.62 As mentioned previously, there were no restrictions 
placed on the transport of nuclear material on the high seas or territorial 
waters and, as such, no security gains were made in this area.63 Finally, 
another aspect which may be seen to have enhanced maritime security is 
the fact that nuclear armed vessels could not be permanently based within 
the region, thus reducing the likelihood of their being targets if conflict did 
break out.64 Even if ships were still able to visit they would be less likely to 
be targeted than a permanent base.  
NZ Territories 
From 1982 to 1990, Niue, Tokelau and the Cook Islands remained 
territories of New Zealand and as such the responsibility for their 
protection and security continued to lie with New Zealand. 65  The 
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responsibility for their maritime security was fulfilled through occasional 
naval patrols.66 
Mutual Assistance Programme 
The Mutual Assistance Programme continued throughout the 1980s and 
grew in size. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this program had been 
created to give military assistance to the ASEAN states, Fiji, Tonga and 
Papua New Guinea. However, it was expanded in the South Pacific so 
that by 1988 it also encompassed Western Samoa, Vanuatu, the Cook 
Islands and the Solomon Islands. This program continued to provide not 
only military training but also aid projects within the member countries. 
This training enhanced the security of these states by strengthening their 
military and police forces, as well as improving the economic and social 
situation. 
Pacific EEZ Patrols 
Throughout this period the RNZN continued to contribute to the maritime 
security of its Pacific Island neighbours through EEZ patrols. These 
patrols, which were often undertaken during transit from New Zealand to 
deployments around the globe, were valuable to the Pacific Island nations 
as they often lacked the capability themselves to undertake such efforts.67 
These were also supplemented by RNZAF patrols using its Orion maritime 
patrol aircraft. While these patrols only happened a few times a year, they 
were also a valuable means of enhancing ties with New Zealand‟s 
neighbours.68 Thus, they not only enhanced maritime security in the region 
but also strengthened relations. 
Search and Rescue 
In 1979, the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (the 
SAR convention) was concluded. The convention came into force in 1985 
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after receiving the 15th ratification 12 months earlier. 69  Once this 
convention had been adopted, the United Nations IMO began the task of 
dividing the world into thirteen Search and Rescue (SAR) areas within 
which there were numerous SAR regions. Search and rescue plans were 
developed for each of these areas and were completed in September 
1998. 70  A certain level of hesitancy by many countries to ratify this 
convention was due to the considerable obligations it placed on those who 
were a party to it. Establishing a Rescue Coordination Centre was an 
expensive undertaking and countries would often be given responsibility 
for a large area, testing their capabilities or at least requiring significant 
resources. New Zealand eventually acceded to the SAR convention in 
1985. 71  This resulted in New Zealand taking responsibility for a large 
Search and Rescue Region (SRR), stretching from the Equator down to 
the Antarctic and from the middle of the Tasman Sea half way to South 
America. The total sea area covered is 30 million square kilometres and is 
one of the largest SRR‟s in the world.72 
Fisheries 
The FFA continued to be active after 1982 and was strengthened by a 
series of agreements which increased its role in contributing to the 
fisheries aspect of maritime security in the Pacific. In 1984, the FFA 
established the Regional Register of Foreign Fishing Vessels.73 This was 
created in order to provide a single shared source of information for the 
registration of foreign fishing vessels. Initially it started out with only 
information from Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. However, 
within five years it had grown to be a truly regional register with 
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information on all foreign vessels licensed to fish in the EEZs of all the 
member nations.74 
On 15 June 1988, the US Multilateral Treaty on Fisheries came into 
force.75 Over several years, the US Multilateral Treaty on Fisheries had 
been negotiated between the US and all members of the FFA in response 
to growing tension over what was seen as illegal fishing by US vessels in 
Pacific nations EEZs. Years of tension finally led to a clash in June 1984, 
when the Solomon Islands Government arrested a US purse seine vessel 
for illegally fishing in the Solomon Islands EEZ. This was the catalyst 
needed to begin negotiations over a treaty that would ensure access to the 
lucrative tuna fisheries of the region for the US purse seine fleet, while 
ensuring that the Pacific Island nations received some sort of payment for 
their valuable resource. 76 
The Multilateral Treaty on Fisheries not only guarantees payment for the 
fish taken, it also guarantees a minimum annual payment to all member 
countries. The treaty sets an annual payment which is then distributed 
amongst the FFA nations: 15% is split equally amongst all members and 
the remaining 85% is distributed according to the proportions of the total 
catch taken from each country‟s EEZ. 77  Starting in 1988, the annual 
payment for the first five years was US$12 million, then for ten years it was 
US$18 million, and finally US$21 million for a further ten years.78 The US, 
in signing this treaty, accepted responsibility to ensure its vessels abided 
by the regulations of the treaty and also by the laws of each of the Pacific 
Island nations whose waters they were fishing in. They also allowed 
observers onboard the fishing vessels to monitor compliance. Another 
important result of this treaty was the de facto recognition by the US of 
states‟ rights to the resources within their EEZ.79 This was an important 
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point because the US had refused to sign UNCLOS which established 
these rights. 
The Multilateral Treaty on Fisheries ensured that each Pacific Island 
nation was guaranteed a small annual income regardless of the volume of 
tuna caught within their waters. For countries like New Zealand and 
Australia this amount was insignificant, but for some of the smaller island 
nations this regular income was important. Not only did this treaty ensure 
economic security, but it also aided regulation of fishing practices which 
helped protect the valuable Pacific fisheries. Furthermore, it was also an 
example of what could be achieved if the Pacific Island nations worked 
together in their dealings with distant water fishing nations (DWFNs). 
Military exercises 
New Zealand‟s military has been involved in exercises in the Pacific since 
World War II. These exercises were mainly carried out in Fiji, however, 
they also took place in Tonga and Papua New Guinea at times. After the 
tensions with the US over the nuclear issue, New Zealand began to 
expand its exercise program into the Pacific.80 In 1985, the New Zealand 
Defence Force (NZDF) held an exercise in Western Samoa and in the 
following year they held a larger one in the Cook Islands. This exercise 
was the largest New Zealand had ever held offshore and it was also the 
first time since WWII that all three services had been involved in a joint 
exercise.81 The increase in frequency and size of exercises in the Pacific 
was likely linked with New Zealand‟s need to replace the exercise time 
and experience it lost after being excluded from all ANZUS exercises with 
the US. 
Western Pacific Naval Symposium 
The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) was established in 1988 
with the goal of bringing together the leaders of navies from around the 
region to discuss issues which affected them all. This was not only an 
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opportunity to share ideas and common experiences, but also to develop 
relationships which would prove useful at a later stage. The WPNS 
avoided dealing with political issues or confidence-building measures 
(CBMs), which were the domain of track I and track II diplomacy. The 
initial members of the WPNS were Australia, Brunei, China, Japan, New 
Zealand, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, the US, Indonesia, Malaysia 
and Papua New Guinea. Membership has grown over time and all new 
members need to be motivated to contribute to the WPNS, and also need 
to receive the support of all the current members.82 
Conclusion 
The period covered in this chapter was a significant one for New Zealand 
in terms of its maritime security and the contributions it made to the 
maritime security of the wider region. The signing of UNCLOS represented 
an important step forward for the international community. Not only had 
they finally reached an agreement after decades of negotiations, but they 
had also succeeded in enshrining in international law a series of important 
principles and rules, some of which had become considered international 
customary law and others which were entirely new and revolutionary. 
While some of these new ideas were highly controversial (in particular the 
provisions which dealt with seabed mining), there was a general feeling 
that this was one of the most significant pieces of maritime law.  
This nine year period demonstrated two clear patterns for New Zealand 
with regard to maritime security matters. The first was tied strongly to 
developments relating to UNCLOS and the second was linked to 
ideological decisions and developments within New Zealand itself and 
their wider implications. After UNCLOS was signed, and despite the fact 
that it did not come into effect until the middle of the next decade, New 
Zealand began to implement measures which highlighted that they 
considered their new resources as highly valuable and the responsibility 
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which came with them as very important. This was strongly centred on the 
introduction of the quota management system in 1986. With the 
introduction of this system, New Zealand signalled that it was serious 
about preserving its fisheries resource and pursuing environmental 
conservation alongside an economically viable fisheries industry. This 
trend was also visible with New Zealand‟s involvement in the Pacific. 
Efforts to aid in Pacific EEZ patrols, as well as involvement in the FFA and 
negotiations for the US Multilateral Treaty on Fisheries, all indicate New 
Zealand taking an active role in promoting the protection and preservation 
of Pacific fisheries for the benefit of the Pacific people themselves. This 
was significant for the Pacific Island nations as they often had an 
extremely valuable fisheries resource as well as a high dependence on the 
revenue it could provide. 
The second trend for New Zealand in maritime security matters was the 
move towards a less dependent, more self-help approach. This reinforced 
the first trend of seeking to capitalise on international legal developments, 
particularly concerning fisheries, and helping the Pacific nations to protect 
and preserve their fisheries resource. This independent stance can be 
seen in the ideological decisions made and the growth of anti-nuclear 
sentiment within the New Zealand public. New Zealand‟s anti-nuclear 
stance led to three significant events during the final Cold War years. The 
first event was the Labour Government‟s policy of banning visits by any 
nuclear powered or armed vessels into its ports, and its subsequent 
decision in January 1985 to refuse port access to the USN frigate the USS 
Buchanan. This decision led to the US Government declaring the US-New 
Zealand leg of ANZUS inoperable and ending all military exercise, and 
training ties with New Zealand. New Zealand‟s relationship status with the 
US was also downgraded (by the US) from ally to friend. This was a major 
blow and signalled a weakening of New Zealand‟s relations with its 
western allies. 
Another impact of anti-nuclear sentiment within New Zealand was the 
French reaction to continuing protests, led by Greenpeace vessels, 
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against this testing. In 1985, French Secret Service agents bombed the 
Greenpeace flagship the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland harbour, killing one 
of the crew members onboard. This attack shocked the nation and even 
more so when it emerged that it was perpetrated by one of New Zealand‟s 
so called western allies. Tellingly, the US and British responses to this 
attack were muted and this only heightened the impression that New 
Zealand‟s anti-nuclear stance was pushing it away from its traditional 
western allies. 
The final event which signalled a distancing from the western alliance was 
the signing of the Rarotonga Treaty and the establishment of the SPNFZ. 
This treaty sought to restrict the nuclear activities of anyone within the 
zone. The restrictions were seen to be primarily aimed at France, who 
continued to test nuclear weapons in the Pacific. However, it also sought 
to place restraints on all the nuclear powers. While this treaty was rather 
limited in its restrictions, largely due to Australia‟s wish to minimise the 
impact it would have on its relationship with the western powers, it did not 
do anything to promote New Zealand‟s standing with its nuclear arms 
possessing allies/friends. 
The years 1982 to 1990 proved, therefore, to be a period of shifting 
priorities. They saw New Zealand shift its focus away from its traditional 
western allies and more traditional naval aspects of maritime security to 
focus on regional affairs and, in particular, fisheries protection and 
management which had come to the fore as a result of UNCLOS. Thus, as 
the Cold War came to an end, New Zealand was seemingly drifting away 
from its traditional allies towards a more locally focused defence policy. 
However, this would once again change with the resurgence in 
multilateralism which occurred after the end of the Cold War. 
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Chapter Four - The Post-Cold War Years, 1990-2001 
Introduction 
The end of the Cold War had a significant impact on the global security 
situation. The balance of power which had existed between the USSR and 
the US for over four decades had ended and the threat of armed maritime 
conflict between these two great powers had virtually disappeared. While 
the likelihood of another World War had decreased, the restraint that the 
Cold War had placed on many regional disputes was no longer present. 
Because of this, the possibility of smaller-scale regional conflicts or 
internal state conflicts increased. However, for New Zealand, the maritime 
environment was largely benign. New Zealand‟s ocean moat distanced it 
from any small-scale conflicts which could emerge and, with the reduction 
in security obligations through the end of ANZUS, involvement in any 
conflicts would be largely voluntary.  
The years between the end of the Cold War in 1990 and the terrorist 
attacks on 11 September 2001 were characterised by a strengthening of 
existing alliances and friendships. This was demonstrated through Closer 
Defence Relations (CDR) with Australia beginning in 1991; the 
development and improvement of the FPDA; New Zealand‟s membership 
in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF); and defence cooperation with 
Southeast Asian and Pacific states through the MAP.  
This period was also significant for the number of influential reviews into 
New Zealand‟s defence. The three most significant reviews were the two 
defence white papers, the Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper 
and The Shape of New Zealand’s Defence: A White Paper (1997), as well 
as the report by the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee 
entitled Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000. These reports, and particularly 
Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000, would shape the way New Zealand 
classified its defence priorities and structured its forces in the years to 
come. This would have dramatic implications for New Zealand‟s armed 
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forces and their ability to contribute to the maritime security of New 
Zealand and the wider region. 
During the years following the Cold War, New Zealand continued to 
strengthen its Navy with the continuation of the ANZAC frigate program 
and in 1998 the government decided to upgrade the Air Combat Force of 
the RNZAF with the lease of 28 F-16 fighter jets from the US.1 Both of 
these decisions (particularly if the option for a third and fourth ANZAC 
class frigate was pursued) would have represented a significant 
improvement in New Zealand‟s ability to contribute to maritime security in 
the Pacific region and further afield. However, by September 2001 the 
impact of financial restraints and a change in government had led to 
decisions to reduce the navy combat force to two frigates2 and not only 
cancel the planned lease of the F-16s, but to disband the Air Combat 
Force entirely.3 All three of these decisions led to a great loss to New 
Zealand‟s maritime security capabilities. 
The final trend that emerged during this period was the creation and 
implementation of a wide range of international agreements which were 
intended to strengthen both global and regional maritime security. These 
included the entry into force of UNCLOS and New Zealand‟s subsequent 
ratification of it; 4  New Zealand‟s ratification of the SUA convention in 
September 19995 as well as the 1993 Convention for the Conservation of 
Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT)6; the Agreement for the implementation of 
the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
10 December 1982 relating to the conservation and management of 
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straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks (UNFSA);7  and, 
finally, the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention (WCPFC) 
which was opened for signature in September 2000.8 All of these events 
and decisions made this period highly important for the maritime security 
of New Zealand and its wider region. 
New Zealand and Maritime Security 
Naval Strength 
In the post-Cold War years, New Zealand continued to maintain a 
significant naval fleet, with four frigates throughout most of the decade. 
However, by the end of the decade, that tradition seemed unlikely to 
continue.  HMNZS Southland was decommissioned in 1997 and replaced 
by HMNZS Te Kaha in the same year, with HMNZS Waikato being 
decommissioned in 1998 and replaced by HMNZS Te Mana a year later.9 
The beginning of the new millennium saw a new government and with it a 
new direction for the RNZN. In 2000, the HMNZS Wellington was 
decommissioned, leaving New Zealand with only three frigates and with 
no replacement in sight. This represented a significant change in policy. In 
the past, the Navy had sought to maintain four frigates at any one time as 
this was seen as the optimal number to be able to carry out government 
policy. In 1997, however, the decision was made that New Zealand would 
not pursue the option of purchasing a fourth ANZAC class frigate. From 
this point on, the RNZN was destined to be a three-frigate navy. 10 
Furthermore, in 1998 the government decided not to purchase a third 
ANZAC class frigate and to delay any decision on a replacement for the 
HMNZS Canterbury until 2002 (any replacement was therefore unlikely to 
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be an ANZAC class frigate).11 The reduction to three frigates in 2000 left 
the navy with what was considered the bare minimum needed to carry out 
policy.12 Government policy was to be able to have one frigate deployed 
overseas all year round, with a second frigate undergoing maintenance 
and refit, while the third would be working up and training after such 
maintenance.13 Reducing the Naval Combat Fleet to three frigates meant 
that if another situation arose elsewhere in the world - even in New 
Zealand‟s own region - where New Zealand wished to maintain a naval 
presence, the navy may be unable to send a warship. This would be a 
considerable restriction on New Zealand‟s maritime capabilities should it 
find itself involved in any significant overseas operations. The only 
mitigating factor, however, was that due to the fact that the ANZAC class 
frigates were new, they would be less likely to need as frequent 
maintenance and repairs.14 Thus, the RNZN ended the period between the 
conclusion of the Cold War and 11 September 2001 with one less frigate 
and, as such, a slightly reduced capacity. 
UNCLOS and the Fisheries Act 1996 
1996 was a significant year for New Zealand in terms of new legislation 
regarding fisheries management and protection. Firstly, in July 1996, New 
Zealand ratified UNCLOS and secondly, also in 1996, the New Zealand 
government implemented a Fisheries Act. This act sought not only to 
protect individual fish stocks, as did the 1986 QMS, but also to protect all 
dependent species and the general maritime environment. 15  It also 
charged the fishing industry for research into the impacts of the fishing 
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industry on protected marine wildlife. In addition, it made the UNFSA New 
Zealand law.16 This Act was another step forward in strengthening the 
legal regime which governed New Zealand‟s fisheries resources and 
sought to bring New Zealand legislation in line with recent international 
agreements.  
Closer Defence Relations 
Since mid-1991, defence relations between New Zealand and Australia 
have been characterised by the term CDR. Under this heading, there have 
been a number of initiatives to strengthen links between the defence 
forces of the two countries.17 These have included a series of committees 
and working groups which have been formed to provide opportunities for 
interaction between officials and platforms for increasing interoperability.18 
In relation to maritime security, the three most obvious and significant 
contributions New Zealand made to CDR was firstly the ANZAC frigate 
program, which continued throughout the decade and, for New Zealand, 
culminated in the delivery of two new frigates, in 1997 and in 1999 
respectively.19 The second major contribution was the basing of RNZAF A-
4 Skyhawks at the RAN base in Nowra, New South Wales. These aircraft 
trained extensively with the RAN and allowed the RAN to practise their air 
defence skills against aircraft other than those of the RAAF.20 The third 
maritime contribution New Zealand made to CDR was the use of the 
RNZN diving support ship, HMNZS Manawanui, as the safety vessel 
during sea trials as part of the Australian Collins class submarine 
program.21 All three of these efforts were symptomatic of the increasing 
closeness between the two nations during the decade immediately 
following the Cold War. Moreover, these efforts increased the ability of 
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both New Zealand and Australia‟s armed forces to contribute to regional 
maritime security. 
The Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper 
In the year in which CDR began, the New Zealand Government released 
Defence of New Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper which outlined important 
issues concerning New Zealand‟s defence. These issues included: New 
Zealand‟s strategic situation and its security interests; a defence strategy 
for New Zealand; the capabilities needed for New Zealand‟s defence; the 
present force structure, planning and funding, and the way ahead.22 This 
policy paper was, and still is, a good source of information on how the 
Government and Ministry of Defence viewed the situation at the time and 
what they thought the future was likely to hold. It also provides an 
important insight into the mindset of those involved in making and 
implementing New Zealand‟s defence and foreign policy and, through that, 
how New Zealand would be involved in maritime security both in its 
immediate region and throughout the rest of the world.  
The paper‟s discussion of New Zealand‟s strategic situation makes it clear 
that there was no perception of an external or internal threat to New 
Zealand‟s security. 23  Therefore, instead of having security needs, the 
policy paper instead identified a series of security interests which would 
govern New Zealand‟s behaviour in its interactions with the outside world. 
New Zealand‟s Government at the time viewed the South Pacific as part of 
its area of responsibility and an area which it took great interest in. 
However, this policy paper showed that it saw little threat and its 
involvement in maritime security would be limited to patrols of Pacific 
Island nations‟ EEZs for illegal fishing and other suspicious activity.24  
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While the Government viewed the Pacific as important, it believed that any 
threat would come from beyond the immediate region. New Zealand was 
conscious of the fact that from Southeast Asia down through Australia was 
the only real land bridge through which any nation could threaten New 
Zealand. 25  Southeast Asia was also considered important because 
shipping routes from New Zealand to Asia, Europe and the Middle East all 
pass through, or close to, Southeast Asia, and would therefore be 
vulnerable to any instability or conflict which could emerge from the region. 
Because of the importance of Southeast Asia, alliances such as the FPDA 
were emphasized as ways in which New Zealand was able to be involved 
in the region.26 
The 1997 Defence White Paper 
November 1997 saw the release of the latest Defence White Paper. This 
report, entitled The Shape of New Zealand’s Defence, reaffirmed the 
findings of the Defence of New Zealand 1991 policy paper with a few 
significant changes.27 In reaffirming the 1991 policy paper, the new White 
Paper also acknowledged that there continued to be few plausible direct 
threats to New Zealand. The three key aspects of defence policy as stated 
in the 1997 Defence White Paper were: 
 defending New Zealand against low-level threats such as incursions into 
our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and terrorism  
 contributing to regional security which includes maintaining our key 
defence relationships with Australia and our Five Power Defence 
Arrangements (FPDA) partners – Australia, United Kingdom, Malaysia 
and Singapore 
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 being a good international citizen by playing our part in global collective 
security efforts, particularly peacekeeping.
28 
These three priorities demonstrated the belief that New Zealand itself 
faced little threat and that the prevailing use of the NZDF would be in 
conjunction with other nations. This involvement outside New Zealand 
became one of the primary justifications for the continuation of the bulk of 
New Zealand‟s armed forces. Due to the lack of any real threats to New 
Zealand, some role other than the defence of New Zealand had to be 
promoted. The emphasis on being a “good international citizen” also 
reflected New Zealand‟s traditional attitude that all nations should play 
their part in the collective security of the world. The White Paper stated 
that the most likely deployment of New Zealand forces would be in a 
peacekeeping role, which New Zealand had increasingly been involved in 
since the end of the Cold War.29 
One of the most significant changes in policy contained in the 1997 White 
Paper was the decision to reduce the naval combat fleet from four to three 
frigates which changed a force structure which had maintained a base of 
four frigates since the end of WWII. 30 This number had only ever been 
lowered between the decommissioning of one vessel and the 
commissioning of its replacement. This decision was also significant 
because, as mentioned earlier in the chapter, it meant that the RNZN was 
operating at what was considered the minimum level still able to carry out 
policy.  
In the White Paper, ASEAN was credited with a role akin to that of a fourth 
regional power in Asia alongside the US, China and Japan.31 The ARF 
was also highlighted as an important mechanism alongside security 
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arrangements such as the FPDA and bilateral alliances between countries 
within the region and the US. 32  All of these organisations were also 
considered important because the stability of Southeast Asia was stated 
as the second most important security concern behind the collective 
security of Australia and New Zealand. The 1997 White Paper re-stated 
the idea that Southeast Asia through to Australia is the only land bridge 
through which New Zealand could be attacked.33 
Interestingly, the White Paper also highlighted the military modernization 
of the Asia-Pacific armed forces at the same time as discussing intended 
reductions in New Zealand‟s naval capabilities. Trends in military 
modernization included acquisition of submarines, modern warships with 
helicopters, anti-ship missiles, maritime patrol aircraft, maritime attack-
capable fighter aircraft and rapid response forces with amphibious 
capabilities.34 All of these modernisations made the maritime environment 
far more dangerous should conflict erupt. It also seemed to bring into 
question the wisdom of the government‟s decision to reduce its own 
maritime forces.  
CDR had played an important role in New Zealand–Australia relations 
since 1991 and the White Paper highlighted many of the activities which 
had taken or were to take place under CDR, including the ANZAC frigate 
program, the basing of RNZAF Skyhawks at Nowra, as well as less well-
known contributions such as personnel exchanges, annual meetings and 
military exercises.35 
New Zealand‟s security requirements for its own territory were stated as 
dealing with low-level contingencies, such as assisting civilian 
organisations in disaster or civil defence emergencies, and maintaining a 
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force capable of addressing any future threat with which New Zealand was 
faced. A military involvement in protecting New Zealand‟s Antarctic 
resources was also envisaged.36  
The security requirements for the South Pacific revolved around 
maintaining stability, meeting obligations to New Zealand‟s island 
territories and giving assistance when requested by Pacific nations. With 
regard to the wider Pacific, the primary focus of the White Paper was the 
provision of military assistance in the case of terrorist threats, natural 
disasters, search and rescue, fisheries patrols and maritime surveillance.37  
The Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000 
In 1997, the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee began 
work on a report entitled Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000. This report 
was a highly significant document and the process through which it was 
researched and compiled was wide-reaching and open to a variety of 
submissions. The composition of the committee was highly significant. 
Due to the nature of the newly established Mixed Member Proportional 
electoral system, the government was in a minority on the committee and 
therefore unable to control the outcome of the final report.38  
This report sought to assess the available options to develop defence 
policy, capabilities and structure beyond the year 2000 with a special 
focus being given to five areas. These are listed in the Inquiry into 
Defence Beyond 2000 as follows: 
(i) Defence strategy and defence policy goals 
(ii) Areas of defence activity requiring particular emphasis 
(iii) The range and nature of defence capabilities and equipment 
required 
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(iv) Structural options, planning and organisation for an appropriate 
and effective defence establishment 
(v) Resource needs and options available within defence for 
redirecting resources to enhance military capabilities.
39 
Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000 contained several suggestions which 
could have had dramatic consequences for New Zealand‟s involvement in 
maritime security. Recommendations included that New Zealand should 
develop closer defence relations with Singapore, Malaysia 40 , Fiji and 
France. 41  The report also suggested that the government review the 
existing policy of being able to sustain a deployment of one frigate/ship 
beyond the South Pacific for a period of up to one year. 42  This 
recommendation, if it was acted upon, would represent a significant 
change in government policy, and with that a reduced ability to contribute 
to the maritime security of the wider region and beyond. Another 
recommendation which could have had an impact on the NZDF‟s ability to 
contribute to maritime security on a regional and global scale was that of 
the sale of the HMNZS Charles Upham and the purchase of two more 
versatile logistic support ships. 43  The report then combined the 
consequences of these last two recommendations and proposed a naval 
fleet consisting of two ANZAC class frigates (with one potentially upgraded 
to similar requirements as the Australian ANZACs) as well as the two 
proposed logistic support ships.44 This would represent a halving of the 
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naval combat force from the levels which had been maintained since 
1966.45 
There were also several significant recommendations made with regard to 
the air force, which could have had an impact on New Zealand‟s 
involvement in maritime security both at home and abroad. The first was 
an assessment of the nature and likelihood of the maritime strike role and 
a comparison between the use of an F-16 and a P-3K Orion for such a 
role, noting if and when an Orion would be insufficient for the task.46 The 
report then recommended arming a limited number of Orion aircraft with a 
maritime strike capability and providing the Army with a limited number of 
attack helicopters to provide the desired close air support.47 This would 
allow the removal of the Air Combat Force. The final recommendation 
regarding the air force was that the government should consider three 
options for the future of the Air Combat Force. The first was to disband it 
based on financial grounds and the savings which could be made. The 
second option was to reduce the force to a maximum of ten well-equipped 
aircraft. The third option was to replace the Skyhawks with more modern 
aircraft (while outlining why they are necessary for protecting New 
Zealand‟s national interests and how they rank in terms of other defence 
expenditure priorities).48 All of these recommendations, if adopted, would 
have had a significant impact, some positive and some negative, on New 
Zealand‟s contribution to maritime security in the future. 
Due to the nature of the divisions within the Select Committee and the fact 
that the government was not in a majority, aspects of the final report 
released in 1999 were strongly opposed by the National government of the 
time. The only recommendations of those mentioned above which the 
government agreed with in its minority report, were those which 
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recommended the strengthening of defence relations with Fiji, France, 
Singapore, and Malaysia.49  
In examining the reports presented, it appears that the majority report 
sought to redefine the way the NZDF was structured into a more focused 
force which was particularly trained and equipped for peace-keeping and 
peace-support operations. Financial concerns were evidently at the 
forefront of issues discussed when capabilities were considered for 
restructuring or disbandment. By contrast, the view presented in the 
government minority report seemed to first consider the capabilities 
needed in order to give the government a balanced force able to respond 
to a wide range of eventualities. Only after these capabilities were 
identified did the cost and choice of specific equipment become a 
consideration. 50  If a certain capability was important enough, funding 
would then need to be found to pay for it. 
Air Force Cancellations, Removals and Disbandments 
The RNZAF Air Combat Force was New Zealand‟s only force capable of 
providing maritime strike, close air support and training in operations with 
fast jet strike capabilities.51 These roles were significant contributions to 
the provision of maritime security.52 In the later years of the decade there 
was significant debate over the utility and worth of the RNZAF A-4 
Skyhawks and the Air Combat Force overall.53 This intensified after the 
                                            
49
 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee, pp. 127-131. 
50
 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee, p. 113. 
51
 Greener, p. 90. 
52
 If a maritime threat was identified and the decision was made to eliminate/stop this 
threat through violent means, then a maritime air strike would often be the only viable 
option. It would often be impossible to divert a naval asset into position in time to 
intercept a given vessel. Close air support is very important to ground forces and navies 
alike. It reduces the risk to naval vessels when operating in a hostile environment by 
carrying out attacks on hostile vessels while allowing the more vulnerable naval vessels 
to remain at a safe distance. While the RNZN frigates have an anti-aircraft capability, they 
would be unlikely to survive a significant aerial attack unscathed. Also, should the need 
arise, they would be less proficient at using this anti-aircraft capability if they had not had 
sufficient opportunity to practise with fast jets in training. David Dickens, Inquiry into 
Defence Beyond 2000: An Independent Review of the Foreign Affairs, Defence & Trade 
Parliamentary Select Committee's Interim Report (Wellington, New Zealand: Centre for 
Strategic Studies, Victoria University of Wellington, 1999), p. 6. 
53
 Greener, pp. 93, 102-103. 
 61 
 
release of the Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000, which considered the Air 
Combat Force to be of low value because the Skyhawks had never been 
deployed in combat. This ignored the reality that very few of the current 
RNZAF aircraft, across all types (not just the Skyhawks), had ever been 
deployed in combat; however, the other types of aircraft retained their 
value.54  
When the Labour led government came to power in 1999, they 
commissioned a review of the decision to lease the F-16s. 55  Derek 
Quigley, the Chair of the Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000 committee, 
was given the task of conducting the review. The review, titled Review of 
the Lease of the F-16 Aircraft for the Royal New Zealand Air Force, was 
published on 6 March 2000. 56  The report recommended that the 
government consider a renegotiation of the lease deal with the US for a 
smaller number of aircraft, thus reducing the costs while retaining an air 
combat capability.57 On 20 March 2000, only two weeks after the release 
of the review into the lease of the F-16s, the government made the 
decision to cancel the lease. After further consideration by the 
government, Prime Minister Helen Clark confirmed on 8 May 2001 that the 
decision had been made to completely disband the Air Combat Force on 
13 December 2001.58 
The decision to not lease the F-16s from the US, and to remove the 
Skyhawks from service and disband the Air Combat Force, were very 
significant events affecting New Zealand‟s ability to contribute to maritime 
security, both at home and in its wider region. With the loss of a maritime 
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air strike capability, several options were suggested including arming the 
P-3 Orions or the Seasprites. However, arming either of these aircraft 
would not provide a comparable option to the capabilities of a fast jet. The 
loss of the ability to train with RNZAF fast jet aircraft was also a significant 
blow to the RNZN who were forced to rely on opportunities to train with 
allies‟ air forces to retain the skills necessary for working with air support 
as well as combating air attack. With the disbanding of the Air Combat 
Force, New Zealand‟s contribution to exercises with regional partners such 
as Australia and the other FPDA members was significantly reduced. 
Finally, this decision also meant the end of an important case of trans-
Tasman cooperation through the stationing of RNZAF Skyhawks in Nowra. 
Southeast Asia and Maritime Security 
Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) 
The decade following the end of the Cold War presented the FPDA as a 
vastly different and improved organisation from what was seen between 
1982 and 1990. In the years between the end of the Cold War in 1990 and 
the events of 11 September 2001, the FPDA moved beyond being an 
organisation that was dominated by internal tensions and suspicions to 
being an organisation beneficial to all involved. Particularly in relation to 
the military exercise program, it showed a determination to adapt to 
changing circumstances. Exercises came to include all three services of 
the five member nations and dealt with non-traditional as well as traditional 
security issues. 59  
With the uncertainty which followed the end of the Cold War, the FPDA 
states, and Malaysia and Singapore in particular, sought to keep all their 
options open by strengthening relations with external allies while at the 
same time welcoming the economic benefits which the rise of China 
brought to the region. Nations in the region were still unsure of China‟s 
long-term intentions and, because ASEAN had proved inadequate at 
military cooperation, alternatives such as the FPDA were welcome 
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opportunities to gain experience and training while maintaining the link 
with external powers (in particular Australia and Britain) to the defence of 
Malaysia and Singapore.60 
For New Zealand, the FPDA exercises provided their greatest opportunity 
to train with multiple skilled allies after the loss of exercise opportunities 
following the split with the US over nuclear ship visits in 1985. The FPDA 
exercises became highly complex and provided great opportunities for the 
development of all the members‟ armed forces. The FPDA also provided 
New Zealand‟s most important link to Southeast Asia: a link that it wished 
to maintain particularly due to the growing importance of Southeast Asia 
and with regard to its strategic location in relation to New Zealand‟s 
seaborne trade.61 
With increasing emphasis being placed on the importance of the 200nm 
EEZ, and an increase in maritime threats, concern among all the members 
of the FPDA led to a mutual interest in addressing maritime issues. 
Security of coastal waters as well as sea lanes of communication (SLOC) 
became an important focus for Malaysia and Singapore with the threats 
posed by piracy, terrorism, illegal migration and smuggling. Sovereignty 
concerns continued with regard to their own territorial waters, however, 
due to their proximity to the Straits of Malacca they were both interested in 
its continuing security.62 
This strengthening in relations also facilitated FPDA activities. From the 
late 1980‟s, when exercises were still being hampered by tensions, the 
FPDA developed to the point where, in 1997, its Air Defence Exercise 
(ADEX) and its Naval exercise (Ex-STARFISH) were combined to form Ex-
FLYING FISH. This was the first time the FPDA had combined the two 
major exercises and it represented a significant increase in complexity and 
value. The first Ex-FLYING FISH in 1997 involved 39 ships, 164 aircraft 
and two submarines. The next year, Ex-FLYING FISH was held again and 
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involved 35 ships, 140 aircraft and two submarines. A third Ex-FLYING 
FISH was held in 2000.63 
It is clear that the FPDA adapted well to the changing security 
environment created with the end of the Cold War. The increase in the 
scale and complexity of military exercises demonstrated a desire to remain 
relevant in the changing world situation. The FPDA exercises, and in 
particular the steady development of naval and air exercises and their 
merging in 1997, constituted a significant way in which New Zealand was 
involved in maritime security in Southeast Asia. 
The ASEAN Regional Forum 
In 1994, the ARF was established in order to bring the ASEAN members 
together with nations from the wider region to work towards greater 
security and stability through effective cooperation. This Forum brings 
together the ten ASEAN members with 13 regional partners64. The ARF is 
an important forum for many of the member nations despite criticism by 
some that it is a talk-shop which delivers little action.65 For New Zealand, it 
is a valuable opportunity to meet with regional and world foreign ministers 
and to be involved in discussions of regional security issues. The ARF 
achieved relatively little during this period with regard to maritime security 
initiatives; however, general cooperation in security issues can also 
contribute to a lessening of potential maritime threats. Also, regular 
meetings of the ARF may have acted as a CBM and contributed to a 
decreased incidence of conflict between member nations. 66  Therefore, 
New Zealand‟s involvement in the ARF is most significant for its value as a 
confidence-building measure.  
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The Pacific and Maritime Security 
The Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna 
In May 1993, New Zealand, Australia and Japan signed the CCSBT.67 
These three nations were the primary nations involved in the SBT fishery. 
Due to drastically declining stocks, these countries agreed to implement a 
management regime which would manage and preserve the highly 
valuable SBT fishery.68 Other nations involved in fishing for SBT were 
encouraged to join, in particular the Republic of Korea, Taiwan and 
Indonesia. Because these countries and their fleets were outside the 
CCSBT, their activities undermined the efforts made to regulate the SBT 
fishery.69 Therefore, emphasis was placed on seeking to involve them, as 
well as other nations, in the Commission and its work.  
The management of the SBT has not been without conflict. In 1999, New 
Zealand and Australia sued Japan over what they saw as Japan‟s breach 
of the TAC set by the commission. 70  Japan had sought to raise the 
countries‟ TACs in 1998 and establish a joint experimental fishing program 
(EFP), however, New Zealand and Australia refused. As a response, 
Japan implemented its own EFP which began to fish in excess of Japan‟s 
TAC.71 The three nations sought to settle the dispute through negotiations, 
but, when these proved unsuccessful and Japan refused to halt its EFP, 
New Zealand and Australia took a case to the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea (ITLOS). While a tribunal was organised to consider the 
matter, New Zealand and Australia sought interim measures to halt 
Japan‟s EFP. This was successful and Japan was forced to halt its EFP 
until the tribunal could hear the case. 72  However, once the tribunal 
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formed, they agreed with Japan‟s assertion that the ITLOS lacked 
jurisdiction and therefore they overturned the interim measures and 
dismissed the case.73 New Zealand and Australia were unable to pursue 
the matter further because the SBT Convention stated that disputes could 
only be adjudicated with the consent of all parties, and of course Japan 
objected to the ITLOS adjudicating this dispute.74 No further progress was 
made in this dispute before the end of 2001. 
The United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks 
In the early 1990s, conflicts around the world between DWFNs and 
coastal states were increasing as high fishing rates and an increase in 
technology began to put increasing pressure on highly migratory and 
straddling fish stocks.75 This in turn led to decreasing fish stocks and the 
recognition by states that, unless something was done soon, the highly 
valuable stocks could be lost. A United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development recommended that an international 
conference be convened to address the issue.76 
The United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks was initiated in November 1992 and met in the UN 
headquarters in New York six times between April 1993 and August 
1995.77 Countries at the conference were effectively divided into three key 
groups. The first group was classified as the extreme coastal states (such 
as Chile, Colombia and Peru) joined with the activist coastal states (such 
as Canada, Argentina and Norway). This group advocated for the primacy 
of coastal state rights both inside and beyond their EEZ.78 The second 
group was the distant water fishing nations (such as Japan, Korea and 
Poland). These nations were understandably in support of DWFN rights 
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and against special rights to coastal states outside their EEZs.79 The third 
and final group was categorised as moderate reformist coastal states 
(such as Australia and New Zealand). These two nations were active in 
promoting the interests of their South Pacific neighbours as well as their 
own.80 The US, Russia and the European Union (EU) occupied a position 
which sought to balance both coastal states and DWFN rights.  
Several areas of tension emerged as the conference progressed over the 
years, and the final convention was a carefully balanced document which 
sought to give something to all parties involved. 81  The UNFSA was 
opened for signature on 4 December 1995. By 1999 it had been signed by 
59 states with 18 states agreeing to it.82 
New Zealand was one of the many states that signed the agreement. This 
agreement was important for New Zealand because of the benefits this 
would bring to the preservation of Pacific fisheries.  
The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Convention 
Negotiations for the WCPFC began in 1994 and were concluded six years 
later.83 The Convention was opened for signature from 5 September 2000 
and it entered into force on 19 June 2004 (six months after the 13th 
ratification). 84  The WCPFC was one of the first regional fisheries 
organisations established since the 1995 UNFSA and it sought to draw on 
many of the provisions of the UNFSA but with consideration for the local 
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conditions.85 The depository for the Convention is the Government of New 
Zealand. This agreement was an important contribution to maritime 
security in the Pacific and also much of Southeast Asia. While there was 
already at least one agreement whose area overlaps with the WCPFC, 
such as the CCSBT, the WCPFC was significant because it addressed all 
highly migratory fish stocks and involved both coastal states of the region 
and DWFNs.86  
The Forum Fisheries Agency 
During the years between the end of the Cold War and 2001, the FFA 
continued to contribute to Pacific maritime security and sought to provide 
member nations with more effective tools for monitoring and protecting 
their fisheries resources.87 
In 1990 and 1993 the FFA revised the Regional Register of Foreign 
Fishing Vessels. Support from DWFNs was initially slow but increased 
towards the end of the decade.88 In a significant development in July 1991, 
DWFNs agreed to cease operating driftnet fishing vessels. Sustained 
pressure from the FFA and the concerned Pacific nations resulted in a 
positive result for the preservation and management of the maritime 
environment in the Pacific.89 
In 1992, after several years of negotiations, the FFA convinced Japan to 
comply with the basic principles of the minimum terms and conditions 
demanded in bilateral agreements with Australia, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, NZ and Palau. However, Japan refused to accept the regional 
register of vessels. This therefore represented a partial victory for the FFA 
and those four member states.90 
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Another positive event for the FFA and its member nations was the 
renewal of the US Multilateral Treaty on Fisheries in 1993. This renewal 
also came with a rise in the annual payment from US$12 million to US$18 
million for a further ten years.91 
In December 1994, the first Multilateral High Level Conference on South 
Pacific Tuna Fisheries (MHLC) was organised by the FFA. This 
conference included both coastal states and DWFNs. The purpose of the 
conference was “to develop strategies for regulating fishing fleets 
operating in the Western Central Pacific”.92 Seven such conferences were 
convened between December 1994 and September 2000 when it was 
decided that a consensus on a convention would be impossible to 
achieve, and the convention was put to a vote with 19 for, two against and 
three abstentions.93  
In 1998, after several years of development, the FFA launched its Vessel 
Monitoring System (VMS). The VMS was intended to give member nations 
accurate and up-to-date information on vessels fishing in their EEZ, this 
would enable them to monitor the activity and investigate or intervene if 
necessary. In order for this system to be effective, vessels needed to 
install an Automatic Location Communicator (ALC) which would transmit 
their location, speed and course to the FFA. Also, FFA member states 
needed to pass laws which made it compulsory for vessels fishing in their 
EEZ to install the ALCs, as well as having them turned on while fishing. 
The FFA keeps a record of all vessels who have installed an ALC and 
possess good standing in the FFA VMS Register. This system was initially 
undermined by objections from DWFNs which was highlighted by the fact 
that only two vessels were registered in the first year. However, by 2001, 
671 vessels were registered with the FFA.94  
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These initiatives emerging from the FFA contributed to the fisheries 
protection and therefore maritime security of the Pacific. New Zealand‟s 
continued involvement in the FFA also contributed to maritime security by 
the extra bargaining power that nations like New Zealand and Australia 
brought to international negotiations. If the smaller Pacific nations were 
forced to go into international conferences and make their case alone, 
they would be unlikely to have much influence. However, when New 
Zealand and Australia present a united front with other Pacific nations, 
they greatly increase the influence at international meetings and 
conferences and thus their ability to improve both global and regional 
maritime security. 
The Mutual Assistance Programme 
The MAP continued throughout the years 1991 to 2001, providing an 
opportunity for the NZDF to train with and support the defence forces of 
friendly nations. In 1991, New Zealand had mutual assistance 
programmes with five of the six ASEAN nations as well as the Cook 
Islands, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, 
Vanuatu and Western Samoa. Main contributions were units of the Land 
Force (including infantry, engineers, medical and dental teams), transport 
aircraft, long-range maritime patrol aircraft, strike aircraft, frigates and 
survey ships. 95  By 1999, New Zealand had strong defence links with 
Malaysia and Singapore (through both the FPDA and to a lesser extent 
the MAP) and weaker links with Brunei, the Philippines, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Tonga, the Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu.96 The MAP continued to be a valuable means through which the 
NZDF was able to assist other nations in improving maritime security as 
well as other defence and civil related tasks. “During the 1999-2000 year, 
the Royal New Zealand Navy devoted 4149 man-days to Mutual 
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Assistance Programme activities, including support of the Australian 
Pacific Patrol Boats operated by South Pacific states.”97 
Conclusion 
The years between the end of the Cold War in 1990 and the events of 11 
September 2001 generally represented an increase in New Zealand‟s 
involvement in maritime security. With the end of the conflict between the 
world‟s two superpowers, the world was suddenly presented with a new 
security environment which many were unsure of and found difficult to 
predict. This uncertainty led to the strengthening of security and defence 
cooperation through a range of relationships and organisations. Defence 
relations with Australia were characterised by the term CDR and this 
relationship continued to be New Zealand‟s closest defence relationship. 
CDR saw a range of opportunities for joint training and interaction between 
officials as well as direct technical cooperation and assistance from the 
RNZAF and RNZN, to the RAN. The continuing relationship with 
Southeast Asia was based on the FPDA and the ARF. The FPDA matured 
as an organisation leading to an increased exercise program and 
strengthening relationships. The FPDA also began to address non-
traditional security issues and in particular maritime security. In 1994 New 
Zealand‟s security relations with Southeast Asia deepened with the 
establishment of the ARF. The ARF brought New Zealand together with all 
the ASEAN members as well as 12 other regional states. New Zealand‟s 
direct defence and security relations with the Pacific were driven by the 
MAP, which gave assistance to regional defence and police forces as well 
as giving New Zealand forces opportunities to train in a different 
environment. This cooperation was also mirrored in the diplomatic realm, 
with a range of agreements negotiated or entering into force throughout 
this period. During this period important international agreements such as 
UNCLOS and the SUA convention came into force after receiving the 
                                            
97
 Stephen Hoadley, 'New Zealand‟s Pacific Island Security Policies', in Security in 
Oceania in the 21st Century, ed. by Eric Shibuya (Honolulu, HI: Asia-Pacific Center for 
Security Studies, 2003), p. 5. 
 72 
 
required international support (New Zealand ratified both these 
conventions during this period after they had come into effect 
internationally). New agreements were also negotiated with the focus 
being on fisheries management and conservation. These agreements 
included the CCSBT between Australia, Japan and New Zealand which 
sought to manage the highly valuable but under-threat SBT stocks. The 
UNFSA was another agreement which was significant and it was 
concluded in 1995. This agreement set the pattern for the management of 
all straddling highly migratory fish stocks worldwide. Finally, the WCPFC 
was concluded in 2000 and became one of the first regional fisheries 
management organisations to be established since the UNFSA. All of 
these agreements as well as enhanced regional security cooperation 
would aid in the global efforts to promote maritime security. 
This period was also characterised by a series of defence reviews, all of 
which shaped New Zealand‟s defence policy as well as drove changes in 
the NZDF force structure. These reviews included the Defence of New 
Zealand 1991: A Policy Paper, The Shape of New Zealand’s Defence: A 
White Paper and Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000. The 1991 policy 
paper described a world in which New Zealand saw little or no direct 
threats. At the end of the Cold War New Zealand saw the Pacific as part of 
its area of responsibility. However, it also recognised that any new threat 
would come from outside the region and the only possible land route to 
attack New Zealand was through Southeast Asia and Australia. Therefore, 
Southeast Asia was seen as an important area for New Zealand to 
maintain defence relationships with. The 1997 defence white paper 
reaffirmed much of the 1991 policy paper with a few important additions. 
One of the differences was the emphasis placed on New Zealand playing 
the role of a good international citizen, primarily through participating in 
peacekeeping efforts. This change reflects the general trend of an 
increase in peacekeeping after the Cold War. The second significant 
difference was the decision to reduce the RNZN combat fleet from four to 
three frigates. Finally, the Inquiry into Defence Beyond 2000 had the 
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greatest impact on New Zealand defence policy going into the new 
millennium. Several changes suggested would create a significantly 
different focus for the NZDF. These changes included reviewing the 
requirement to be able to deploy one frigate/ship overseas for up to one 
year, a further reduction in the number of frigates to two, and removing or 
reducing the Air Combat Force. With this came a change in focus in favour 
of the army and its likely role as a peacekeeping force. These changes 
would lead to a reduction in the abilities and roles of the RNZN and 
RNZAF.  
The situation at the end of this period is in clear contradiction to the 
pattern which had emerged. Due to uncertainty about the new security 
environment, New Zealand had sought to reach out and become more 
heavily involved in maritime security in the Asia-Pacific. It is ironic then 
that by the end of this period the newly elected government was making 
decisions which would leave New Zealand with a reduced capacity for 
enforcing and influencing maritime security militarily.  These decisions 
were made just as the world‟s strategic circumstances were to change 
dramatically once again with the attacks on the Twin Towers and the 
Pentagon on 11 September 2001. 
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Chapter Five - The Post-September 11 Search for 
Security, 2001-Present 
Introduction 
On 11 September 2001, world governments were reminded of the threat 
which terrorism posed to their nations‟ security. The terrorist attacks 
against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, and the world‟s 
response to them, heavily influenced the security environment for the rest 
of the decade. 
Because of these attacks and others, terrorism forced its way onto the 
security agenda early in the new decade. Subsequent events in Southeast 
Asia, such as the Bali terrorist bombing on 12 October 2002 by members 
of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and the JI bombings of the Marriott Hotel in 
Jakarta on 6 August 2003, brought the threat closer to home for New 
Zealand and into its wider region. 1  These land-based attacks also 
triggered concerns about the possibility and potential impact of a maritime 
terrorist attack in Southeast Asia. During the 2001 – 2010 period, two 
significant maritime terrorist attacks occurred giving credibility to these 
fears. On 6 October 2002, the MV Limburg, a French flagged oil tanker, 
was attacked with a small, unmanned, explosive-filled craft off Yemen, 
killing one crew member and releasing 90,000 barrels of oil into the sea.2 
In February 2004, the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf bombed the SuperFerry 
14, a passenger ferry in the Philippines, killing 116 people.3 These attacks 
have greatly increased fears of further maritime terror attacks in the 
Southeast Asian region. 
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During this period, several initiatives have been launched to specifically 
address the threat of terrorism against shipping and trade. These include 
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), the International Ship and Port 
Facilities Security Code (ISPS code) and the Secure Trade in the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Region (STAR) initiative. Terrorism, 
along with piracy, also moved onto the agenda of regional organisations 
such as the ARF and the FPDA. 
Due to decisions made early in the decade, New Zealand‟s naval 
capabilities were reduced in 2005 when the HMNZS Canterbury was 
decommissioned. However, seven new ships have been purchased 
through Project Protector which has greatly increased the RNZN‟s ability 
to enhance maritime security in home waters and the Pacific region. This 
is particularly likely to occur through fisheries protection and EEZ patrols.  
A significant process which began during this decade, and is still ongoing, 
is the 2009 Defence Review. The review will examine the shape of the 
NZDF and its priorities for the next 20 years. The review will be completed 
early in 2010 and will decide the future direction and capabilities of the 
NZDF. This will have an important impact on New Zealand‟s contribution 
to maritime security in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. 
Fisheries protection and management continued to be a maritime security 
focus for New Zealand, with several important developments occurring in 
the Pacific, including the entry into force of the Convention for 
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks of the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean and the development of the South 
Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO). 
Fisheries protection and management became established alongside 
other efforts as part of New Zealand‟s traditional contribution to maritime 
security. 
Throughout this period, New Zealand‟s contributions to maritime security 
in the Pacific and Southeast Asia continued. Some of these contributions, 
such as participation in the FPDA, ARF, APEC and the WPNS, adapted to 
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include a stronger focus on maritime security and terrorism. Others, such 
as the MAP and SAR within the Pacific, continued as before. 
New Zealand and Maritime Security 
Proliferation Security Initiative 
Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the worst case 
scenario envisaged was the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) 
by terrorist groups, or „rogue states‟. In 2003, in order to address concerns 
over the spread of WMDs, the United States launched the PSI.4 The PSI is 
an attempt to create a global effort to prevent the proliferation of WMDs. 
This effort is aimed both at non-state actors such as terrorists, as well as 
states of concern who may be seeking to spread WMD technology. It 
encourages all participating nations to review their legislation and 
regulations with regard to export controls and to take steps to prevent the 
trafficking of WMDs.5 Countries are expected to board and inspect vessels 
or aircraft which are suspected of carrying WMDs, whether they are 
registered in their country or another country who gives them permission. 
So far, over 90 countries have endorsed the principles of the PSI. New 
Zealand endorsed the principles in June 2004 and has since been 
involved in several multilateral exercises to test the capabilities of 
participating nations to carry out the aims of the PSI.6 In September 2008 
New Zealand hosted a PSI exercise (exercise Maru) in Auckland Harbour 
which involved countries from the Asia-Pacific region and beyond, both as 
participants and observers. This exercise was an important part of New 
Zealand‟s strong commitment to the PSI and to stopping the spread of 
WMDs. In contrast to other multilateral efforts concerning maritime 
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security, the PSI is considered a series of activities rather than an 
agreement or institution.7  
ISPS Code 
An example of a more traditional international agreement is the SOLAS 
convention. Since its entry into force in 1974, it has undergone numerous 
amendments, the majority of which have dealt with issues of maritime 
safety. However, in 2002, a special conference was held which resulted in 
an amendment that added a new chapter to the convention.8 This chapter 
(XI-2 Special measures to enhance maritime security) was focused on 
ensuring the security of both ships and port facilities. The most significant 
regulation in this new chapter concerned the adoption of the ISPS Code 
which eventually came into effect on 1 July 2004.9 
The ISPS Code contains three main levels of responsibility and areas of 
security consideration. The first level is the government. Each contracting 
government must designate a body to set and continually update the 
current security level for all port facilities and ships.10  This designated 
authority may choose between three security levels: level one is the 
minimal level of security requirements; level two requires additional 
measures due to heightened risk; and level three requires specific further 
measures when an incident is probable or imminent.11 This body must also 
carry out port facility security assessments highlighting any areas of 
vulnerability and measures which could be taken to remedy them. 
The second level of responsibility is that of the port facilities themselves. 
All port facilities must maintain a port security plan. This security plan must 
address any vulnerabilities identified by the port facility security 
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assessment.12 It must also be continuously updated to address any new or 
emerging threats. A port facility security officer has the responsibility of 
enacting, and keeping current, the port facility security plan and liaising 
with the ship security officers.13 
The third level of responsibility is that of the individual ships and their 
owners. Each ship must have a security assessment carried out by a 
qualified person which identifies any vulnerabilities that the ship 
possesses.14 The owners of that ship must then develop a ship security 
plan based on the ship security assessment. Each ship must have on 
board an individual who is nominated as the ship security officer and is 
responsible for the up-keep and operation of the ship security plan, as well 
as liaising with the port facility security officer.15 
New Zealand implemented legislation to bring the provisions of the ISPS 
Code into effect on 5 April 2004 through The Maritime Security Act 2004.16 
All New Zealand‟s ports were compliant with the ISPS code before the 1 
July 2004 deadline. 
New Zealand and other regional nations (e.g. Australia and the US) gave 
financial assistance to the Pacific Island nations in order to aid them in 
meeting their obligations by the July 2004 deadline.17 All but one Pacific 
Islands Forum country met the deadline for all ports to have carried out 
assessments and implemented security plans.18 
Another significant requirement which resulted from the amendments to 
SOLAS is that all ships are required to have a ship security alert system 
fitted. This can be activated from the bridge as well as at least one other 
location on board the ship if the ship comes under attack or its security is 
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compromised. 19  The system then sends an alert to the owner or a 
designated authority, giving the location of the vessel and informing them 
that the ship‟s security has been breached.20 Hopefully, this information is 
then forwarded on to the relevant coastal state authorities who would be in 
a position to come to the aid of the ship. While this system appears to be 
an important contribution to enhancing the safety of shipping, 
implementation and use of the system has failed to meet expectations and 
modifications may need to be made in order for it to realise its full 
potential.21 This system, as well as the implementation of the ISPS code, 
will greatly increase maritime security by making ships and ports harder to 
attack and ensuring people within the shipping industry are better 
prepared for any attack. New Zealand‟s support of this code and its 
implementation highlights New Zealand‟s commitment to increasing 
maritime security in its own territory and further abroad. 
IMO Council 
Another significant event for New Zealand in relation to the IMO was its 
election to the IMO council in 2007. This gave, and still gives, New 
Zealand greater influence in the IMO and means New Zealand is involved 
in ensuring the IMO‟s primary objectives are achieved. 22  It will also 
increase the voice of the Pacific region within the IMO. New Zealand will 
be able to advocate for initiatives which have direct relevance to the 
Pacific Island Nations.23 This is a valuable opportunity for New Zealand to 
be involved in facilitating maritime security worldwide, as well as 
encouraging efforts particularly relevant to the Pacific region. 
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Naval Strength 
The RNZN entered this period with a naval combat force of three frigates. 
In March 2005, however, the HMNZS Canterbury was decommissioned 
leaving the RNZN with only two frigates and no planned replacements.24 
This is the lowest number of combat vessels the RNZN has had since 
WWII. However, the Navy‟s capabilities have been subsequently 
enhanced through Project Protector by the purchase of seven new 
vessels.25  The first to arrive was the new multi-role vessel (MRV) the 
HMNZS Canterbury, which was commissioned on 12 June 2007.26 The 
MRV is able to carry out EEZ patrols, transport the Army and their 
equipment, as well as support disaster relief operations. The MRV can 
embark either two Seasprite helicopters or four of the NH90 Medium Utility 
Helicopters which the RNZAF is in the process of acquiring.27 This will 
greatly aid in transferring supplies and equipment during disaster relief 
efforts.  
Also acquired were four Inshore Patrols Vessels (IPVs). They are HMNZS 
Rotoiti, HMNZS Hawea, HMNZS Pukaki, and HMNZS Taupo. The four 
IPVs were commissioned between 17 April and 29 May 2009. These 
vessels will help to meet the need for EEZ and resource protection patrols, 
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both in New Zealand waters and in the Pacific. 28 They will operate in New 
Zealand waters assisting other government agencies such as the Ministry 
of Fisheries, the New Zealand Customs Service, the Department of 
Conservation, the Police, and Maritime New Zealand. This ability was one 
of the key considerations when the decision was made on the 
specifications for the Project Protector vessels. 29  
The final purchase under Project Protector was that of two offshore patrol 
vessels (OPVs). The first, the HMNZS Otago, was accepted on 18 
February 2010, and the second, the HMNZS Wellington, is expected to be 
accepted in April 2010.30 This is despite initial expectations that the first 
would be delivered in mid-2006. 31 The OPVs, once commissioned, will 
further enhance New Zealand‟s patrol and surveillance capability. They 
are ice-strengthened, enabling them to undertake patrols into the Southern 
Ocean and Antarctic waters. 32  They will each carry one Seasprite 
helicopter, which will greatly increase their surveillance capabilities. All 
three classes of vessel are only lightly armed: the MRV and the OPVs are 
each fitted with a 25mm bushmaster naval gun as well as two 0.50 calibre 
machine guns, while the IPVs will each be armed with three 0.50 calibre 
machine guns.33 Even though they are not suited to combat operations, 
they will be able to carry out EEZ patrols, disaster relief, search and 
rescue, and boarding and inspection of suspect vessels. The purchase of 
these ships has greatly increased New Zealand‟s ability to carry out a wide 
range of maritime security related operations.  
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Defence Review 
In order to examine New Zealand‟s role and ability to contribute to regional 
and global security, the New Zealand Government and the Ministry of 
Defence launched a Defence Review in April 2009. The intention of this 
review is to: 
Undertake a fundamental assessment of the security environment 
in which we live, to consider the roles that our Defence Force is 
expected to fulfil now and in the future, and to examine how well it 
is currently meeting its obligations.34 
This review process, which considers the role of the Defence Force for the 
next 20 years, has included public submissions as well as NZDF internal 
discussions, meetings with defence academics and contributions from the 
Royal New Zealand Returned and Services Association.35 The review has 
the potential to drastically change the shape and focus of the NZDF or it 
could re-affirm the direction which it is already taking. This review was an 
election promise of the current National government and the aim is for it to 
be completed in March 2010.  
Considering the recent major naval purchases it is unlikely that any 
significant change will be made in the force structure of the RNZN. The 
cost of re-acquiring an air combat force is prohibitive, reducing the 
likelihood that significant changes will be made with regards to the 
RNZAF, which has also spent considerable funds recently on the upgrade 
of the P-3 Orions and the purchase of new helicopters (eight NH90 
Medium Utility Helicopters and five A109 Training/Light Utility Helicopters). 
Considering the current world financial situation, it is unlikely that any 
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significant new platforms will be acquired for any of the three services. 
However, a new direction or focus may be adopted by the review which 
could then lead to major purchases being made in the future. One aspect 
of the current defence force structure which may be changed is the focus 
on peacekeeping and resource protection capabilities ahead of outright 
defence or combat capabilities. Because this review has the potential to 
shape the future direction of the NZDF, it will also have a great impact on 
New Zealand‟s ability to contribute to maritime security in Southeast Asia 
and the Pacific. This review may also be affected by recent developments 
in New Zealand‟s relations with the US. 
US Exercise Ban Lifted 
In 1985, New Zealand lost the opportunity to exercise with the world‟s 
premier military power when the US banned all exercises with the NZDF. 
Due to improving relations with the US, the New Zealand Government has 
confirmed the ban on military exercises will soon be lifted.36 This indicates 
US recognition of New Zealand‟s contribution during recent conflicts, such 
as Afghanistan. It will also rectify the inconsistency between the practice of 
New Zealand troops fighting alongside US forces and the policy which 
prevented them from training and exercising together.37 Exercising with 
the US armed forces will be a significant opportunity for New Zealand‟s 
forces to improve the level of their training and exercises.38 This will be 
highly important if New Zealand wants to maintain parity with the armed 
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forces of Southeast Asia, who are steadily improving the quality of their 
armed forces both in terms of personnel and equipment. 
Southeast Asia and Maritime Security 
Five Power Defence Arrangements 
After 11 September 2001, the FPDA continued to adapt to retain its 
relevance. In seeking to adapt to the new security environment, the focus 
of FPDA discussions and exercises continued to emphasise a significant 
maritime focus.39  Considering the potential cost of a maritime terrorist 
attack on the Malacca Strait, and the increase in the number of piracy 
attacks in Southeast Asia40, an increasing maritime security focus was a 
logical conclusion and provided the catalyst for FPDA exercises to 
intensify the focus on maritime security related issues.41 
In June 2003 the Defence Ministers of the five countries met for the annual 
FPDA Defence Ministers‟ Meeting (FDMM). At the meeting they reaffirmed 
their commitment to enhancing both their collective and individual defence 
capabilities and, as part of that, an increasing level of interoperability.42 
The Ministers also decided that the FPDA should focus on enhancing a 
capability to deal with “non-conventional challenges such as terrorism, 
piracy, protection of Exclusive Economic Zones, disaster relief and 
smuggling of illicit drugs”. 43  Sovereignty concerns, particularly from 
Malaysia, had always restricted efforts to address issues within an 
individual state‟s territory, and it was agreed at the FDMM that this change 
of focus to asymmetric threats would only occur at a pace with which all 
nations were happy.44 Also in 2003, the focus on asymmetric threats was 
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reiterated when the FPDA Professional Forum agenda focused on how to 
bring such threats into the FPDA training and exercise programs.45 
In 2004, the FPDA Defence Ministers met informally and discussed co-
ordinated patrols, information sharing and improved communication 
between navies and coast guards. They also announced that additional 
exercises specifically focused on maritime security should be held and that 
civilian agencies should be slowly included in these.46 
These new exercises started in 2004 with Ex-BERSAMA LIMA (meaning 
Five Together). This exercise involved 31 ships, 60 aircraft, 2 submarines 
and 3,500 support personnel, making it one of the FPDAs largest ever 
exercises. 47  The exercise included a simulated terrorist hijacking of a 
merchant ship with participants conducting a Maritime Interdiction 
Operation which involved tracking, stopping and boarding the suspect 
ship. This exercise was the first instance of civil-military coordination as 
well as the first time maritime terrorism was addressed in FPDA 
exercises.48 Ex-BERSAMA LIMA was repeated in 2005. The integration of 
civilian participants and the focus on maritime security continued in 2006 
with Ex-BERSAMA PADU. 49  This exercise sought to address possible 
maritime security threats as well as improving coordination in defending 
vital SLOCs. During the exercise, both piracy and terrorism were 
addressed. Two ships were stopped and boarded and then civilian 
agencies were brought in to inspect the ships and their cargoes.50 
With the FPDA exercises increasing in complexity since 2001, New 
Zealand has been restricted in its ability to contribute due to the changes 
made in the NZDF force structure. The removal of the Skyhawks from 
service in December 2001 has prevented New Zealand from contributing 
an air combat capability. Also, with the RNZN reduced to a combat fleet of 
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only two frigates from 2005, New Zealand is not in a position to contribute 
more than one frigate, which is sometimes supported by the non-combat 
vessels of the RNZN.51 This limited contribution again highlights that the 
FPDA provides more benefits to New Zealand than New Zealand gives 
back. Despite this, the FPDA has allowed New Zealand to build deep 
relationships with nations in Southeast Asia and, through this, contribute to 
the security of the region. 
ASEAN Regional Forum 
The ASEAN Regional Forum also continues to be an important 
mechanism for New Zealand to engage with the nations of Southeast Asia 
and the other members of the ARF. Since 11 September 2001, the ARF 
has widened its focus to include issues such as terrorism and maritime 
security, meaning that it continues to remain a relevant, although slow 
moving and restricted, organisation.52 Like other Southeast Asian bodies, 
it is restricted by sovereignty concerns, and this will continue to limit the 
ARF‟s ability to address issues such as maritime security. Despite these 
restrictions, the ARF held its first ever maritime security exercises, albeit 
table-top exercises, in Singapore in January 2007. 53  This may be a 
significant first step towards increasing the ARFs contribution towards 
maritime security. New Zealand continues to play an active role in 
addressing maritime security through the ARF and will be hosting the ARF 
Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security in March 2010. New Zealand 
has placed a high value on these meetings and is a very active member in 
this regional effort. 
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APEC STAR Initiative 
In 2002, APEC, another important regional organisation, launched the 
STAR initiative which aimed to enhance port and shipping security 
throughout the Asia-Pacific. The APEC leaders also reaffirmed APEC‟s 
commitment to meeting the necessary standards of the IMO ISPS code by 
July 2004.54 
The STAR initiative was intended to improve member nations‟ capabilities 
for protecting their trade against terrorist attacks as well as building 
efficient and secure trade throughout the region. The APEC leaders 
agreed to enhance their own capabilities and assist others. Terrorism was 
emphasized as the biggest threat to secure trade and as such the primary 
focus of efforts under the initiative.55  
One of the ways in which the STAR initiative sought to secure trade was 
by developing and instituting an effective container security regime. The 
aim was to guarantee that containers would remain secure during transit 
and to single out high-risk containers and inspect them before transit. 
Cargo information would also be provided to the recipient state as early as 
possible. 56  All of these were to be achieved while promoting and 
enhancing efficient legitimate trade. The initiative also sought to enhance 
the protection given to ships by promoting the ISPS code and its 
requirement for security plans for both ships and port facilities.  
APEC also encouraged nations to promote the fitting of Automatic 
Identification Systems to ships as required by the modification to the 
SOLAS convention.57 In seeking to increase its effectiveness in dealing 
with maritime security issues, APEC encouraged cooperation between its 
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organisations, members and international bodies such as the IMO and the 
IMB and their Piracy Reporting Centre.58  
The increasing attention given to maritime security, and particularly to 
secure trade, was one way in which APEC allowed New Zealand to 
contribute to maritime security in the region. In particular, the STAR 
initiative was a valuable contribution as it sought to increase regional trade 
security simultaneously rather than just one country at a time. By seeking 
to move the entire region forward together, gains made would be less 
likely to be undermined by a lack of security in a neighbouring or regional 
state. 
The Pacific and Maritime Security 
New Zealand‟s role in providing maritime security assistance to the Pacific 
Island nations has increased since 11 September 2001. Due to Australia‟s 
heavy involvement in military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, their 
ability to provide assistance to the Pacific region has been diminished. 59 
As a consequence New Zealand, through its RNZAF Orions, is currently 
the primary provider of maritime surveillance for the Pacific Island nations. 
New Zealand‟s support for the Pacific Islands has now spread from the 
Polynesian region, where New Zealand has traditionally had stronger ties, 
to include assistance to the Melanesian region as well. 60  While New 
Zealand remains second to Australia in terms of the level of contribution to 
regional maritime security, it currently provides more surveillance 
assistance than Australia. New Zealand is also seen as easier to approach 
and more likely to respond positively to requests for assistance.61 The 
level of contribution New Zealand makes to regional maritime security is 
likely to increase further with the use of the OPVs, which are currently 
being prepared for entry into service in the RNZN in 2010. These vessels 
will increase the Navy‟s capability to patrol the Pacific Ocean and 
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therefore provide the RNZN with more options when it comes to providing 
regional assistance with activities such as fisheries protection and SAR.62 
Fisheries 
New Zealand continued to maintain an interest in developments 
concerning Pacific fisheries after 2001. Through membership in the FFA, 
New Zealand has consistently contributed to fisheries protection and 
management in the Pacific. Since 11 September 2001, the FFA has seen 
several significant events occur. In 2002 the second 10 year extension of 
the US Multilateral Fisheries Treaty was agreed upon between the US and 
the FFA member states. This extension came into effect in June 2003 and 
with it an increase in the annual payment from US$18 million to US$21 
million. 63 In 2003 the Convention for Conservation and Management of 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean 
was ratified by the 13th state which set in motion its entry into force six 
months later. The Convention came into force on 19 June 2004. 64 
In its role as a larger partner in the FFA, New Zealand has maintained a 
responsibility for assisting the Pacific Islands in the surveillance and 
protection of their fisheries resources within their EEZs. 65 New Zealand, 
with a large EEZ, a strong fishing industry and a concern for its Pacific 
neighbours, plays an active role in protecting and managing regional 
fisheries. 66  This is demonstrated by New Zealand‟s active role in 
organisations such as the FFA and the South Pacific Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisation, as well as being a signatory of agreements 
such as the Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, the 
United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement and the Western and Central 
Pacific Fisheries Convention. 
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South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation 
In 2006, New Zealand, Australia and Chile proposed a series of 
international meetings in order to address the need to manage the non-
highly migratory fish stocks of the South Pacific region.67 These meetings 
(International Consultations on the Establishment of the Proposed South 
Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation) were attended by a 
range of nations either present in the area or with fisheries interests in the 
region, and resulted in the establishment of the SPRFMO.68 The purpose 
of this organisation is to aid in the management and protection of non-
highly migratory fish stocks (as highly-migratory fish stocks were already 
being covered by the UNFSA). Eight meetings were held between 
February 2006 and November 2009. At the eighth and final meeting in 
December 2009, the parties adopted the Convention on the Conservation 
and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the Southern Pacific 
Ocean which was opened for signature from 1 February 2010. 69  New 
Zealand was not only an active participant in the meetings, but it also 
hosted the interim secretariat and contributed the majority of the funding 
for its operation. This involvement is indicative of New Zealand‟s desire to 
be involved in the provision of maritime security in the Pacific. 
Mutual Assistance Programme 
New Zealand continues to fulfil its defence and security obligations to the 
Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau, through EEZ patrols, resource protection 
and assistance to the Police forces of the Cook Islands and Niue. The 
relationship between New Zealand and Samoa continues to be strong and 
New Zealand has an obligation to sympathetically consider requests for 
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defence assistance. 70  The MAP has endured to the present and now 
includes assistance programmes to Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Thailand, Brunei, Tonga, Papua New Guinea, Western Samoa, Cook 
Islands, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and Niue. Other MAP activities with 
individual Pacific Island nations are conducted on a case by case basis.71  
Search and Rescue 
A further ongoing contribution by New Zealand is its responsibility for an 
extensive SRR as well as assistance to Fiji in meeting its SAR obligations. 
The RNZAF maintains a P-3 Orion on 24 hour call-out, ready to conduct 
SAR operations within two hours of receiving a request. Recent high 
profile operations have also included the RNZN assistance in the search 
for the wreckage of the Tongan ferry, the Princess Ashika, which sunk in 
August 2009. The RNZAF assisted in SAR patrols looking for survivors 
and the RNZN sent a team to Tonga, who were able to locate the 
wreckage, confirm the identity of the vessel and provide assistance to 
investigators seeking to determine the cause of the sinking. 
New Zealand is also involved in the France, Australia, and New Zealand 
(FRANZ) agreement, which is intended to address cooperation in disaster 
relief, search and rescue and maritime surveillance.72 There are also bi-
annual exercises held in New Caledonia under this agreement. These 
exercises, codenamed Southern Cross, involve New Zealand, Australia 
and France as well as other regional states. 
Western Pacific Naval Symposium 
The cooperative efforts of regional navies have provided an important 
means through which maritime security has been advanced. Since its 
creation in 1988, the WPNS73 has developed from just meetings to the 
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publication of procedures or handbooks and multilateral exercises. 74 
These handbooks developed by individual nations, focus on certain 
aspects of naval operations or interactions and have been presented to 
the WPNS before their recommendation for adoption. Mine Counter 
Measures is one area in which the WPNS has worked to build individual 
and collective capabilities since 1997, with several exercises being held 
since 2001.75 
The key benefit of the WPNS is enhancing naval cooperation through 
bringing personnel together and forming relationships and understanding 
of how each other operates in order to build trust and understanding.76 
New Zealand‟s membership and involvement in the WPNS is yet another 
demonstration of its desire to contribute to the maritime security of the 
Pacific region in a meaningful way. 
Conclusion 
After the tragic events of 11 September 2001, the world was reminded of 
its vulnerability to such attacks and concern about terrorism began to 
feature prominently on regional security agendas. The impact this had on 
the Asia-Pacific region was reinforced by terrorist attacks in Indonesia and 
the Philippines. The proof that terrorism was present in the region, as well 
as recognition that an attack on the busy waters of the Malacca strait 
would have a considerable impact on the world‟s shipping, meant that 
maritime security and terrorism had to be considered. This resulted in 
maritime security being the focus of a series of initiatives including the 
ISPS Code, the PSI and the APEC STAR initiative.  
New Zealand‟s ability to contribute to maritime security both at home and 
throughout its wider region was considerably enhanced by the purchases 
of new ships for the RNZN through Project Protector. These ships 
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included one MRV, four IPVs and two OPVs. The OPV‟s will enable the 
RNZN to patrol down into the Southern Ocean or up into the Pacific, and 
the MRV will greatly contribute to relief efforts in any Pacific or Southeast 
Asian humanitarian crises/natural disasters. 
Traditional institutions continued to grow during this period, with the FPDA 
strengthening and expanding its exercise program to include valuable 
combined land, air and sea exercises with a specific focus on maritime 
security. The ARF also moved to address maritime security issues; 
however, as usual, progress through that avenue was slow. New Zealand 
also maintained its traditional commitment to providing SAR within its 
considerable SRR, as well as assisting other nations in the Pacific.  
Fisheries is another area in which New Zealand has contributed to 
regional maritime security. A proposal by New Zealand, Australia and 
Chile to establish a South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisation resulted in the signing of the Convention on the Conservation 
and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the Southern Pacific 
Ocean. New Zealand is also the host nation for the secretariat established 
to administer this convention. The FFA continued to be an important 
organisation and New Zealand‟s involvement saw it providing fisheries and 
EEZ patrols to fellow members of the FFA.  
In 2009, a defence review was launched with the intention to examine the 
future structure and roles of the NZDF. This review has the potential to 
significantly affect New Zealand‟s future ability to contribute to maritime 
security. Finally, in 2010, New Zealand‟s warming defence relationship 
with the US has led to the announcement of the imminent lifting of the 
exercise ban between the two countries‟ forces. 
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Chapter Six - Future Directions 
Introduction 
Dramatic events at the beginning of each of the past two decades have 
changed the worldwide security situation and shaped the way in which 
countries have approached international relations. The end of the Cold 
War and 11 September 2001 were completely unexpected. It is possible 
that such an event will occur again at any time, changing the direction of 
security efforts once more. However, it is almost impossible to prepare for 
such an event other than to maintain a range of security capabilities, both 
military and civilian, which are able to deal with any events that may 
unfold. Because it is impossible to predict the future, we must instead turn 
to the past for indications of what may lie ahead. Throughout this thesis, 
New Zealand‟s involvement in maritime security in Southeast Asia and the 
Pacific has been traced. This thesis has attempted to identify relevant 
trends and these will be used to provide a means for not only mapping the 
past but also predicting the future.  
This chapter seeks to build upon previous chapters and use them as an 
indicator of possible future outcomes. Some of the predictions made are 
based upon the continuation of long-standing institutions and agreements, 
and others are based upon the expectation of a continuation of current 
trends in international events. These, of course, are vulnerable to sudden 
international change, just as predictions made in the late 1980s or 1990s 
were.  
This chapter also seeks to couple predictions of future developments with 
suggestions of actions which could be taken both to respond to these 
developments, and to be better prepared for a range of potential future 
scenarios. These suggestions are based upon knowledge gained through 
an analysis of recent history as well as drawing on the ideas of the many 
published authors who are experts in their various fields.  
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The three core themes which will be presented within this chapter are the 
expectation that asymmetric and non-traditional threats will continue as 
one of the core threats to maritime security; that traditional involvements in 
maritime security will continue, and that organisations will adapt to meet 
the needs of the situation; and the increasing modernization and, in some 
cases, expansion of regional and extra-regional armed forces. 
New Zealand and the Future 
Naval Capacity 
The key trend that has emerged in the last decade is the rise in 
asymmetric threats. Whether it is terrorism, piracy or regional instability 
due to insurgent movements, the likelihood is that many of the future 
conflicts will not involve inter-state conflict. The New Zealand Defence 
Force needs to be equipped to face these threats wherever it might meet 
them. Our army needs to be able to respond quickly and effectively to 
land-based threats within our territory and our wider region. The RNZN 
needs to be able to control our territorial waters and EEZ and be an 
effective force against a wide range of threats which it may face. It must 
also give the NZDF the ability to be involved in military operations outside 
New Zealand‟s region and be able to support the Army, particularly in the 
Pacific region.  
The purchase of the new Project Protector ships reflects this move away 
from a high-end combat capability to a wider range of capabilities, albeit at 
a lower level of intensity. The Navy, however, cannot afford to completely 
ignore the high-end combat capability and, as such, the ANZAC frigates 
should continue to be upgraded throughout their lifespan and be replaced 
with combat capable ships when they are eventually decommissioned. It 
needs to be recognised that, in multilateral efforts, the RNZN can do more 
than just transport the Army. Naval power can be directly involved in 
combat operations, such as shore bombardment, or by patrolling coastal 
regions to intercept shipments of arms or supplies, preventing them from 
reaching the enemy. 
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Naval vessels are also a good way of „showing the flag‟, or sending a 
message, through their presence in a region. Having army units in or near 
a country of interest during a period of conflict can be perceived as a 
serious and aggressive stance. Naval units, however, are able to loiter in 
the region, either out of sight or over the horizon, demonstrating a 
presence without the same level of aggression. They are also able to be 
withdrawn by the government without the same appearance of 
capitulation. If a conflict was brewing in the Pacific and the New Zealand 
Government either wanted to show support for a government or send a 
message of restraint, a naval vessel could be deployed to the region, 
staying in international waters without violating anyone‟s sovereignty. 
However, troops would not be able to be sent without the express 
permission of a host government. New Zealand should be very careful 
how it deploys its warships, because claims of intimidation or manipulation 
would greatly damage its credibility with the Pacific Island nations.  
Maritime Surveillance Aircraft 
New Zealand should maintain its maritime patrol aircraft capability into the 
future. The Orion maritime patrol aircraft are important to both New 
Zealand and the wider region. New Zealand and Australia possess some 
of the best maritime surveillance capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region and 
it will be important to maintain these. These aircraft are highly valuable in 
roles ranging from search and rescue and fisheries protection, to EEZ 
patrols for illegal or suspicious activity. 1  They are also effective in a 
combat situation for monitoring either New Zealand‟s approaches or a 
chosen operational environment.2  
When considering an aircraft to replace the Beech King Air B200 in the 
Advanced Pilot Training role, the NZDF and the New Zealand Government 
should choose an aircraft which gives an additional maritime surveillance 
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capability at a lower level to the Orions.3 New Zealand should consider 
aircraft such as the RAAF Super King Air 350. The RAAF pilot training 
using these aircraft includes maritime surveillance operations and maritime 
training flights. 4  These aircraft would be able to patrol within New 
Zealand‟s EEZ and carry out many of the same functions as the Orions, 
albeit without the Orions’ combat systems. These aircraft would 
complement New Zealand‟s SAR capabilities and could work jointly with 
the newly acquired Inshore and Offshore Patrol Vessels. Using these 
smaller aircraft for maritime surveillance and training would release the 
Orions for operations further afield and enhance the range of skills pilots 
could develop during training. New Zealand‟s maritime patrol capability 
plays a vital role in New Zealand‟s contribution to maritime security both at 
home and abroad and, as such, it should be maintained. 
Maritime Special Forces  
Another option for dealing with the rise in maritime asymmetric threats 
throughout the region is emphasising the utility of Special Forces. 
Consideration should be made of whether the Special Air Service (SAS) 
should work increasingly alongside the navy or if a small naval Special 
Forces unit should be established to deal with high intensity maritime 
asymmetric threats. In a case of a possible maritime terrorist attack, a 
pirate attack or a hijacking, New Zealand needs to have a capacity to 
respond.5 While these possible incidents are rare or nonexistent in New 
Zealand, given the rise in fears of all three possibilities, particularly in 
Southeast Asia, New Zealand should be equipped to deal with such a 
scenario if it should occur within its region. Closer defence relations with 
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the US, and in particular its Special Forces, would also provide an 
opportunity to develop the skills necessary to establish this capability. 
Submarine Proliferation 
There are an ever-increasing number of nations throughout the world, and 
particularly in Southeast Asia, who are purchasing submarines as part of 
the modernization of their navies. 6  This development will lead to a 
significant number of submarines navigating in the already crowded 
waters of Southeast Asia, thus increasing the likelihood of an accident or 
incident. Due to the strength of sovereignty concerns within Southeast 
Asia, the potential for any intrusion by a foreign submarine into another 
nation‟s territorial waters would likely be viewed as hostile.7  
Not only do these vessels pose a risk during peace time, but they also 
have obvious offensive capabilities during a period of conflict. If conflict 
occurred, either between two Southeast Asian states, or between one of 
them and a state from outside the region, then the risk posed to shipping 
in Southeast Asia could be significant. New Zealand needs to be aware 
that if it were to be directly or indirectly involved in a conflict in the region, 
then not only could its naval vessels be at risk, but also its seaborne trade. 
The NZDF‟s limited anti-submarine capabilities 8  mean that its vessels 
would be at greater risk if operating with a hostile submarine present and 
they are therefore limited in the protection they are able to provide to New 
Zealand‟s shipping.9 Improvement of this capability may be considered by 
the current Defence Review. 
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The Defence Review 
The Defence Review launched in 2009 has the potential to vastly change 
the shape and focus of New Zealand‟s defence forces. However, given the 
current economic situation and the recent purchases by the NZDF, drastic 
change is unlikely. With the RNZN receiving seven new ships in recent 
years through Project Protector, the shape and direction of the RNZN is to 
a certain degree set, at least for the near future.10 The RNZAF is also in a 
similar position, with considerable funds having been spent upgrading both 
the Hercules and Orion aircraft and with the purchase of the Boeing 757-
200 aircraft for strategic airlift. 13 new helicopters have also been 
purchased to replace the Iroquois and Sioux helicopters currently in 
service.11 Given the cost of acquiring new capabilities or reacquiring lost 
capabilities, it is unlikely that the government will opt for a new direction or 
role for the RNZAF.  
One of the possible changes with an impact on New Zealand‟s ability to 
contribute to maritime security is a shift away from the focus on 
peacekeeping as the primary role of the NZDF. In the past decade, the 
Labour-led government consistently emphasised that New Zealand‟s 
primary contribution to multilateral military efforts would be through Army 
involvement in UN peacekeeping.12 It is possible that as a result of the 
Defence Review the National-led government will decide to adjust to a 
wider focus involving all three services in an active role, with each service 
making an important contribution beyond supporting the Army.  
It is likely that the Defence Review will support an increase in cooperation 
between the NZDF and New Zealand‟s other government agencies. The 
IPVs provide a good means through which the RNZN is able to assist 
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other agencies and this will continue to be an important role for them in the 
future. The RNZAF continues to assist Maritime New Zealand and their 
Rescue Coordination Centre with the provision of SAR assistance with 
both the Orion and Hercules aircraft.13  The role the Army can play in 
assisting other government agencies is likely to be increased, particularly 
in situations where the police or other agencies could be greatly assisted 
by the use of Army equipment and resources. 
New Zealand will always rely on working with other like-minded nations 
when it deploys troops beyond the Pacific. This means that New Zealand 
will need to maintain strong defence relationships with other countries, 
particularly in light of the changing nature of recent conflicts. During the 
decade following the Cold War, there was a significant increase in UN 
peacekeeping missions.14 However, since September 2001, international 
interventions have been „coalitions of the willing‟ rather than UN 
operations. If this trend continues, New Zealand cannot rely on working 
through the UN. Instead, involvement will come through relationships with 
other countries. 
Fisheries 
Relationships with other nations will also be a valuable means of 
promoting issues which are of a particular interest to New Zealand. With 
its strong history of fisheries management, New Zealand should try to play 
a prominent role in implementing good fisheries practices throughout its 
wider region. If successful, it will benefit from stable and sustainable 
fisheries throughout Southeast Asia and the Pacific. This will also 
hopefully reduce illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU) fishing 
in the region and in Antarctica. In order to increase its chances of success, 
New Zealand should cooperate and work with Australia and other nations 
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in the region who share this goal and possess relevant expertise. Bodies 
such as the FFA, the WCPFC and the developing SPRFMO should all be 
supported and encouraged to also play a role in stopping IUU fishing. 
If IUU fishing continues, then New Zealand will need to enhance its 
protection of its EEZ and that of its Pacific neighbours who are unable to 
do so adequately themselves. Loss of fisheries revenue due to illegal 
fishing may threaten the economic and wider security of Pacific Island 
nations.  
Southeast Asia and the Future 
Terrorist Attacks 
In the last decade, terrorism has emerged as a very real risk, particularly in 
Southeast Asia. The effects of a terrorist attack in either the Malacca Strait 
or one of the major ports within the region, especially Singapore, would be 
catastrophic. 15  If terrorists succeeded in sinking a large ship in the 
narrowest part of the Malacca Strait, then there would be the possibility of 
the Strait‟s temporary closure and shipping companies being forced to 
send their ships through another, more expensive, route.16 International 
shipping would also be operating under conditions of heightened fear and 
those nations heavily dependent on seaborne trade, such as New 
Zealand, may find their economic security at risk. An attack on a port such 
as Singapore using a ship carrying an explosive cargo, such as a Liquid 
Petroleum Gas carrier, would be even more dramatic. Such an act would 
potentially kill thousands of people and damage one of the world‟s busiest 
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ports.17  Because of concern that the same methods may be used by 
terrorists to hijack a ship as would be used by pirates, there is a need for 
increased emphasis on dealing with piracy. In order to lessen the risk of 
maritime terrorism, New Zealand should promote international initiatives 
which seek to minimise the risk of an attack. New Zealand should 
encourage regional nations to participate in efforts such as the PSI and 
APEC STAR initiative, as well as complying with the ISPS code. 
Organisations such as the ARF and FPDA should also be encouraged to 
include a robust maritime terrorism aspect to their programs, whether it is 
through exercises or discussions. Finally, New Zealand should promote 
the regional adherence to the principles of the Container Security Initiative, 
even though it is not a member, and continue to adjust its own systems to 
align with this initiative. These measures will allow New Zealand to be 
involved in the strengthening of regional defences against the threat of 
maritime terrorism. 
Piracy 
Piracy is an issue which has in the past plagued Southeast Asia, and in 
particular Indonesia and Malaysia. 18 While piracy figures in the Malacca 
Straits have decreased since 200519, attacks in the Singapore Straits and 
the South China Sea have increased. 20 Some people have concerns that 
the global financial crisis will cause piracy to rise once again. If piracy were 
to increase again in Southeast Asia, then it would have the potential to 
impact on New Zealand‟s trade, much of which relies on safe passage 
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 Joshua H. Ho, 'The Security of Sea Lanes in Southeast Asia', Asian Survey, 46, no. 4 
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through Southeast Asia and in particular the Malacca Strait. Another 
possible consequence of an increase in piracy is that if the littoral states 
appear to be unable to control the situation themselves, then outside 
states may intervene. Those states who rely heavily on the security of 
seaborne trade, and in particular its passage through Southeast Asian 
waters, may decide that the model established for intervention in Somalia 
could also work in Southeast Asia.21  
This model would be considered by Indonesia and Malaysia, in particular, 
as an extreme violation of their sovereignty, and would have the potential 
to cause tension, and maybe even conflict, between those nations and any 
nation seeking to use force within their territory. New Zealand should 
encourage the Southeast Asian nations to work hard to control piracy and 
assist them in any way it can. These nations have been open to 
assistance by foreign nations in the past, as long as it is on their terms and 
does not involve the use of force.22 Therefore, New Zealand, as a non-
threatening nation, should play an active role in promoting cooperation 
and assistance to address the root causes, as well as the symptoms, of 
piracy. By enhancing the maritime security of Southeast Asian waters, 
New Zealand would also be helping secure safe passage for its trade and 
shipping, on which it heavily relies.  
The Five Power Defence Arrangements 
Given the resilience shown by the FPDA in the past, the signs are positive 
for it to continue to function as a valuable contribution to security in 
Southeast Asia. However, in order for it to do so, it must overcome several 
hurdles. The first challenge is due to the rising costs for all parties in 
participating in the FPDA exercises. This is particularly expensive for New 
Zealand, Australia and Great Britain, who have to send their forces a 
considerable distance in order to take part. Unless the FPDA exercises 
                                            
21
 Mark J. Valencia and Nazery Khalid, 'The Somalia Multilateral Anti-Piracy Approach: 
Caveats on Vigilantism' at Austral Policy Forum 09-4A (2009), p. 4. 
22
 Valencia and Khalid, p. 5. 
 104 
 
continue to remain relevant and valuable, the three external members may 
be forced to reconsider their level of participation.23 
The second problem the FPDA faces is the high level of operational 
commitments that Australia and Great Britain are currently maintaining due 
to their commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. With Australia and Great 
Britain committed elsewhere, Malaysia and Singapore may expect to take 
a greater role in the management of FPDA bodies such as the 
headquarters Integrated Area Defence System, and if this occurs Australia 
and Great Britain may be less interested in maintaining their 
commitment.24 
A third difficulty that the FPDA faces is that, as Australia and Great Britain 
seek to remain interoperable with US forces, they may move away from 
capabilities which are relevant to the FPDA. Also, if they move at a pace in 
acquiring new technologies which the other partners are unable to 
maintain, interoperability within the FPDA may be significantly 
compromised.25 
While these issues definitely present challenges which the FPDA member 
nations will need to overcome, the organization has proved resilient in the 
past and it has changed to become a relevant organisation which is 
directly addressing current security issues in the region. Considering the 
development seen in the FPDA since its creation in 1971, it would be 
unfortunate for it to fail to overcome these new challenges. New Zealand 
is a great supporter of the FPDA, and in order to ensure it continues and 
remains relevant, it should make every effort to overcome these 
challenges. 
The ASEAN Regional Forum 
New Zealand‟s membership of the ARF will enable it to contribute to 
discussions on regional responses and actions regarding issues such as 
maritime security. New Zealand is unlikely to be viewed suspiciously or 
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with hostility within the ARF, and thus it may be well placed to make 
suggestions and contributions in the area of maritime security. Maritime 
security in Southeast Asia has often been hampered by sovereignty 
concerns, especially when extra-regional powers attempt to make 
suggestions on how the Southeast Asian region should handle the issue. 
These suggestions are often seen as outside states attempting to infringe 
on the littoral states‟ sovereignty. Southeast Asia‟s acceptance of New 
Zealand as a significant participant in maritime security discussions can be 
seen by New Zealand‟s hosting of the 2nd ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on 
Maritime Security on 29 and 30 March 2010.26 New Zealand is likely to 
continue to be active within this forum and can potentially play a significant 
role in enhancing maritime security in Southeast Asia through this 
involvement. 
The Pacific and the Future 
Traditions Continued 
There has been a strong tradition of New Zealand involvement in maritime 
security in the Pacific and this is likely to continue. As one of the larger 
regional states, New Zealand maintains a strong obligation to assist its 
neighbours in ensuring their security. New Zealand also benefits from this 
arrangement as any instability or insecurity in the region has the potential 
to affect New Zealand as well. 
New Zealand‟s defence obligations to its island territories will continue for 
the foreseeable future. These territories are so small that they would have 
very little likelihood of surviving economically if they were to remove 
themselves from their special relationship with New Zealand. The MAP will 
also likely continue into the future, with New Zealand aiding Pacific Islands 
defence and police forces to meet the various challenges they face in 
attempting to enforce their control over their often vast areas of 
jurisdiction. Additionally, New Zealand will continue, and likely have an 
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increasing role, in fisheries protection in the Pacific, particularly through 
EEZ patrols.  The OPVs will be well suited for this and will garner goodwill 
from Pacific Governments. New Zealand will be particularly relied upon if 
Australia continues to maintain a high level of involvement in overseas 
conflicts, such as Iraq and Afghanistan.27 Currently these efforts absorb 
much of Australia‟s resources, and therefore they are unable to provide 
the same level of assistance to the Pacific island nations.  
The FFA will continue to be an important means through which Pacific 
Island nations are able to gain assistance for the management and 
protection of their fish stocks. New Zealand, through its membership in the 
FFA, will continue to assist the other members. This will take the form of 
technical assistance and advice, as well as practical measures such as 
EEZ patrols and maritime surveillance. The FFA provides a wide range of 
fisheries management tools, but without the means of monitoring and 
enforcing them, the Pacific island nations would be unable to gain their full 
benefit. New Zealand is able to provide the practical means, as well as the 
diplomatic influence, to monitor and enforce these regulations. New 
Zealand is likely to continue to advocate for the Pacific Islands in 
international forums, when their interests coincide. This is often the case 
with maritime security issues. 
China’s Growing Influence in the Pacific 
Because of the growth of China‟s armed forces, people in China‟s region 
are wary of its future intentions. China is a growing world power and it 
wants to be able to have the influence that it sees as commensurate with 
such a position.28 One of the reasons given to explain China‟s naval build-
up is to be able to ensure that no outside state could interfere in any 
confrontation with Taiwan, which China sees as an internal matter.  
China also has territorial disputes with its Southeast Asian neighbours. 
China claims the South China Sea and its islands as part of Chinese 
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territory and disputes ownership claims by at least four of the Southeast 
Asian states.29 This has in the past caused huge tension and even direct 
military conflict. While in recent years China has agreed to settle all South 
China Sea disputes without using violence, its past actions leave many in 
the region sceptical. 30  China‟s claims, as those of the other claimant 
nations, appear to be driven by the desire to claim exclusive rights to the 
vast oil and gas resources believed to be present under the sea floor of 
the South China Sea.31  
If China were to return to violence to resolve these territorial disputes, it 
would not only have an impact on the nations in the region, but also 
outside nations such as New Zealand who rely on safety and stability in 
the region for uninterrupted trade.32 If China was to have a direct conflict 
with Malaysia, New Zealand would also be faced with the dilemma of how 
to react, given its membership of the FPDA and the obligation this brings 
to consult if Malaysia or Singapore is threatened or attacked.33 While this 
is an unlikely scenario, New Zealand must be wary of the military and 
particularly naval rise of China.  
If China seeks to challenge the US Navy‟s dominance of the Pacific, then 
the consequences could be significant for the Asia-Pacific region as a 
whole.34 China has already stated a desire to increase its naval influence 
out into the Pacific and the US is unlikely to give up its influence willingly. 
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China is also trying to spread its influence in the Pacific through diplomatic 
and financial means.35 If successful, this would see a decrease in New 
Zealand‟s influence in the region. Of particular concern is China‟s attempt 
to gain influence in post-coup Fiji. Fijian military officers are now replacing 
lost training opportunities with New Zealand and Australia, with training in 
China and India. Of particular concern is China gaining access to Fiji‟s 
deep-water port and airport, which if available for use by China‟s military, 
would give it a base from which it could project power throughout a wide 
region of the Pacific. 
Conclusion 
As New Zealand looks to the future, it needs to take account of the 
asymmetric threats which have emerged as a pressing threat to world 
security. Thus, New Zealand has to adapt and develop new capabilities 
and relationships able to effectively deal with these threats. New Zealand 
is also faced with the reality that countries surrounding it are modernizing 
and strengthening their armed forces, particularly their navies. This raises 
the potential intensity of hostilities which would ensue if conflicts were to 
break out, and New Zealand needs to be conscious of what these new 
acquisitions mean for its ability to ensure its own maritime security and 
wider interests. In order to respond to these challenges, New Zealand will 
continue its traditional contributions as well as building on new capabilities 
and an increasing role in regional organisations which enable it to 
participate heavily in maritime security in the region.  
The primary maritime security threats to New Zealand‟s territory include 
IUU fishing, and other illegal activities within New Zealand‟s EEZ and 
territorial waters. New Zealand also faces possible threats from the 
increasing number of submarines being acquired by Southeast Asian 
navies. While the RNZN‟s capabilities have been enhanced, more can be 
done. In 2009, New Zealand launched a Defence Review which will shape 
the future of the NZDF and the role it plays in regional and global security.  
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In Southeast Asia, terrorist attacks and piracy remain significant threats 
which could affect New Zealand‟s security. There is also a continuing 
trend within regional security organisations to focus on maritime security 
and New Zealand has sought to play a prominent role in these 
discussions.  
Within the Pacific, New Zealand is likely to continue with its traditional 
involvements in the region. New Zealand will maintain its defence 
obligations to its island territories, and continue to assist its smaller 
northern neighbours through EEZ patrols. The MAP is likely to remain an 
important means for New Zealand to assist regional police and defence 
forces. It will also maintain its SAR commitments to the region. 
Furthermore, the FFA will remain a highly important organisation for the 
Pacific nations and New Zealand. Additionally, New Zealand should be 
wary of China‟s growing influence within the region. China is potentially 
looking to challenge US dominance in the Pacific, and this could have a 
negative impact on security throughout the Pacific.  
Finally, as we look towards the future it seems that New Zealand is finally 
coming to terms with the reality of its maritime environment and the 
security implications which come with it. New Zealand has significantly 
increased the navy‟s capabilities and is beginning to take an increasingly 
active role in international organisations dealing with maritime security. 
This all bodes well for New Zealand‟s future involvement in maritime 
security in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. 
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Chapter Seven - Conclusion 
Throughout the period covered in this thesis, the way in which New 
Zealand has sought to be involved in maritime security has evolved. In the 
early post-WWII years, New Zealand‟s primary focus was on the threat 
posed by the Soviet Navy and therefore it established a navy based 
around fast ASW capable frigates and an air force capable of tracking and 
attacking enemy submarines. New Zealand‟s view of maritime security 
focused on naval threats from other countries and as such it was the 
domain of the armed forces.  
As negotiations for UNCLOS progressed it became clear that the idea of a 
200nm EEZ was likely to be accepted and made international law. 
Because of this, many nations, including New Zealand, declared 200nm 
EEZs and suddenly found themselves with rights and responsibilities for 
large maritime areas. This led to an increased emphasis being placed on 
fisheries and resource protection as part of maritime security. However, 
this remained the realm of the RNZN, who were responsible for patrolling 
the EEZs of New Zealand and its Pacific neighbours.  
The mid-1980s saw New Zealand adopting a more independent stance 
and falling out with the US over nuclear ship visits. This resulted in New 
Zealand focusing on its own maritime security issues such as fisheries 
management. New Zealand also sought to increase its involvement in the 
provision of maritime security for its Pacific neighbours. This was achieved 
through objections to French nuclear testing, the creation of the SPNFZ 
and increasing military exercises with local defence forces 
With the end of the Cold War, New Zealand, along with many other 
nations, sought to adjust to the altered security environment. New Zealand 
increased its involvement with its remaining allies and built deeper 
relationships with regional (Southeast Asia and the Pacific) neighbours. 
Fisheries protection and management also emerged as an important focus 
for maritime security with the decrease in perceived threats that came with 
the end of the superpower rivalry. Another result was the re-examination 
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of defence priorities in order to adjust to the new strategic environment. A 
consequence of this was a reduction in the combat capabilities of the 
NZDF as no direct threat was seen. 
With the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, the global security 
environment once again altered significantly. New Zealand, like most of 
the world, sought to support the US-led efforts to combat terrorism. Initially 
this did not have a strong maritime dimension. However, as the 
implications of a maritime terrorist attack on international shipping or a 
busy port in Southeast Asia were realised, maritime terrorism became an 
important focus as well. This focus was reinforced by terrorist attacks in 
Southeast Asia including the bombing of a ferry in the Philippines. Piracy 
had also grown as a security issue in Southeast Asia and forced its way 
onto the maritime security agenda of states involved in the region and 
regional organisations. New Zealand has been involved in these issues 
through the FPDA and the ARF. These events saw New Zealand‟s focus 
on maritime security move even further away from state-based threats to 
include asymmetric threats as well as fisheries. 
As we look to the future, many of New Zealand‟s traditional involvements 
in maritime security in the Pacific will continue. Involvement in Southeast 
Asia will likely continue through New Zealand‟s membership of regional 
organisations and security relationships. Asymmetric threats and IUU 
fishing appear to be the most likely maritime security threats. New Zealand 
needs to develop its approach to maritime security if it is to successfully 
combat these threats. However, New Zealand also needs to be wary of 
the increasing number of submarines being acquired by regional armed 
forces and the potential threats these may pose. China‟s growth as a 
world power and its naval expansion have the potential to upset the 
regional balance of power and possibly create a threat to regional 
maritime security. New Zealand needs to maintain a balanced approach to 
maritime security by being prepared to address a range of threats. This 
includes maintaining a high level maritime combat capability as a 
precaution against the possibility of facing such a threat.  
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The period of time covered in this thesis has seen New Zealand‟s 
involvement in maritime security move full spectrum from the traditional 
idea of maritime security to a far more modern and comprehensive view. 
This has involved a transition from the navy focusing on threats from other 
states to the navy, in concert with organisations such as the Ministry of 
Fisheries, addressing non-traditional issues such as fisheries protection. 
From there, the focus has moved completely away from traditional state-
based threats to asymmetric threats involving non-state actors such as 
pirates and terrorists. The navy is still the primary mechanism for dealing 
directly with these threats. However, organisations such as Customs and 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade have also taken part in 
developing systems for dealing with such threats. The changing security 
environment has also seen an increase in diplomatic efforts to address 
maritime security issues and this has been evidenced in the range of 
international agreements negotiated. New Zealand is now faced with the 
challenge of combining the past approach of dealing with naval threats 
with the current approach of dealing with asymmetric threats in order to be 
prepared for an uncertain future.  
While New Zealand has been successfully involved in a wide range of 
efforts to increase maritime security, there have been several areas of 
concern and also potential problems for the future. Throughout the years 
covered in this thesis New Zealand has at times demonstrated a 
concerning pattern of being slow to sign, and especially ratify, important 
international agreements. This has certainly been the case in regards to 
important agreements such as UNCLOS, SUA and the IMO SAR 
convention. If New Zealand is to present itself as a nation wishing to 
promote maritime security, it needs to be willing to follow through and sign 
and ratify international agreements in a timely manner. In the case of the 
SUA convention, New Zealand did not make the provisions of the 
convention New Zealand law until seven years after the convention came 
into effect internationally. For a convention which New Zealand was 
involved in negotiations for, and which it signed, the delay is concerning. 
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In regards to New Zealand‟s reluctance to ratify UNCLOS, it is somewhat 
ironic that one of the primary concerns was the US stance on UNCLOS 
when, only years after UNCLOS was signed, New Zealand ignored US 
opinion when banning visits by nuclear vessels to New Zealand. 
The consequences of the decision to ban nuclear ships are another area 
where the New Zealand Government appeared to relegate maritime 
security concerns behind other agendas. The loss of the defence 
relationship with the US brought with it a considerable decline in New 
Zealand‟s maritime security. Not only did New Zealand lose the guarantee 
of US support if attacked, but New Zealand‟s armed forces also lost 
valuable training opportunities and access to equipment and intelligence. 
Thus, while the decision to ban nuclear powered ships may have been 
defended as increasing New Zealand‟s security by reducing the chance of 
attack, it had an even greater negative effect on New Zealand‟s maritime 
security. 
This stance regarding the danger of nuclear weapons was also seen with 
New Zealand‟s objections to French nuclear testing in the Pacific. For 
years New Zealand attempted to bring about an end to French testing on 
environmental grounds and the dangers it posed to the Pacific maritime 
environment. These efforts were largely unsuccessful and opposition to 
French nuclear testing brought about a violent response from France. In 
1985, in an attempt to stop Greenpeace protests at Moruroa atoll, the 
French secret service bombed the Greenpeace flagship the Rainbow 
Warrior causing irreparable damage and killing one crew member. Despite 
New Zealand‟s strong reaction to the attack, they were unable to bring the 
majority of those involved to justice. The inability to bring the perpetrators 
to justice was a disappointing end to a shocking attack carried out in New 
Zealand. 
Another poor decision by the New Zealand Government, which decreased 
its ability to be involved in the provision of maritime security (and security 
in general), was the cancelling of F-16 lease and disbandment of the Air 
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Combat Force. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, the RNZAF Air Combat 
Force would have been one of the NZDFs best assets when a quick 
response was needed for dealing with a high risk maritime threat. This 
decision, coupled with the same government‟s decision to reduce the 
RNZN Combat Force to two frigates, indicates a distaste for dealing with 
the high intensity end of the maritime security spectrum. This is 
disappointing because for a nation to be truly secure and prepared for 
future threats it needs to be willing to address all levels of maritime 
security.  
Following the decision by the government to cancel the planned upgrade 
of the Orions’ mission systems, they eventually adopted a similar upgrade 
without the ASW capability. Helen Clark, the Prime Minister at the time, 
argued that there were no hostile submarines in the region nor had the 
Orions ever found any, therefore maintaining a submarine detection 
capability was unnecessary. This may yet prove to be a very short-sighted 
view, with many nations in Southeast Asia now acquiring a submarine 
capability. This decision has seen New Zealand move away from an 
important part of its traditional approach to maritime security and may 
prove costly in the future. It also limits New Zealand‟s ability to contribute 
to certain aspects of any future multilateral operations given their inability 
to detect, track or attack hostile submarines.1 
New Zealand has for many years enjoyed the luxury of being 
geographically removed from any major threats to its security. However, 
as the global security environment has changed New Zealand has had to 
face the reality that its interests may soon come under threat. The future is 
uncertain, but New Zealand must acknowledge its maritime nature and be 
better prepared to face whatever maritime security threats should emerge. 
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to attack them. 
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